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Jefferson and Juries:
The Problem of Law, Reason, and
Politics in the New Republic
by

DANIEL

D.

BLINKA*

As the twenty-first century begins, we are still perplexed about the
proper role of juries in our legal system. Some are understandably concerned about the ability of lay jurors to find facts accurately and reliably,
whether in complex civil litigation or even in routine criminal cases. 1
More problematic is the role of the jury as a political agency with the
power to nullify established law. Put differently, how do we reconcile
obeisance to the rule of law with the jury's raw power to override statutes
or settled case law? Some commentators have suggested a principled
basis for jury nullification, 2 yet caprice, emotion, and even whimsy-a
troubling mixture-might very well also play into the jury's decision.
Perhaps a good part of our difficulty arises from a modern reluctance to
view the jury as a political agency of any sort. 3 Nonetheless, the historical
record reveals that the nation's founders clearly understood the jury's
political power and openly embraced it. 4 In short, the roots of nullification
are deep and intertwined around the core ideas and experiences that led to
*Daniel D. Blinka, Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School, Milwaukee,
Wisconsin. I thank Professors Jean B. Lee (especially), John Milton Cooper, Jr., and Stanley
I. Kutler of the University of Wisconsin-Madison for their comments and insights on earlier versions of this research. I also wish to thank my colleagues at Marquette, particularly
Bruce Burton, Thomas Hammer, Scott Idleman, Alan Madry, David Papke, Michael O'Hear,
and Andrea Schneider for their insights at a faculty workshop. This work was greatly assisted by summer research support provided by the late Dean Howard Eisenberg, former interim
Dean Janine Geske, and Dean Joseph D. Kearney.
1. E.g., Gary L. Wells & Eric P. Seelau, Eyewitness Identification: Psychological
Research and Legal Policy on Lineups, I PSYCHOLOGY, PUB. POL'Y & L. 765 (1995)
(proposing rule changes based in part on concerns that jurors do not adequately appreciate
the risk of overly suggestive procedures); Ronald S. Longhofer, Trial Techniques in
Complex Civil Litigation, 32 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 335, 337 (1999) (discussing the "daunting" task jurors face in complex cases and recommending techniques to "aid" them).
2. E.g., Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal
Justice System, 105 YALE L. J. 677 (1995); David Dorfman & Chris lijima, Fictions, Fault,
and Forgiveness:Jury Nullification in a New Context, 28 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 861 (1995).
3. See Jon M. Van Dyke, The Jury as a Political Institution, 16 CATH. LAW. 224, 230
(1970) (discussing jury instructions under Maryland law, where juries in criminal cases are
judges of law as well as fact). Indeed, one "solution" has been to ignore the problem by not
permitting arguments or instructions in the apparent hope that jurors are otherwise ignorant
of their "power" to nullify. See David Brody, Sparfand Dougherty Revisited. Why the Court
Should Instruct the Jury of its Nullification Right, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 89 (1995).
4. See Irwin Horowitz & Thomas Willging, Changing Views of Jury Power: The
Nullification Debate, 1787-1988, 15 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 165 (1991).
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the American Revolution and the new republic.
From the very inception of the American Revolution, Virginia politicized and embraced juries in two striking ways. First, the commonwealth
enshrined the jury as the centerpiece of republican legal institutions by
broadly expanding its use. The jury thus served as a democratic instrument for popular participation in governance. Second, Virginia simultaneously enlisted the jury to solidify support for the War of Independence an
undeniably "political" function. Yet these developments are complex and,
to a degree, paradoxical because we also find their chief architect,
Thomas Jefferson, simultaneously excluding juries in other "enlightened"
reforms (e.g., criminal law) and spearheading a frighteningly broad wartime attainder-a legislative declaration of guilt and death that completely
dispensed with juries and even courts.
In sum, Virginia's experience with juries during the Revolution is
important for at least several reasons. First, it offers vital lessons regarding civil rights in times of turmoil and terror. Second, it opens deeper
insights into the nature of jury nullification. Third, and closely related, the
Virginia experience provides an important perspective regarding how the
founding generation understood the jury right.5
The venerable jury had performed its ancient common law functions
through much of the colonial period, yet Virginians seemed somewhat indifferent toward trial by jury until the mid-eighteenth century. 6 After 1750,
indifferent respect blossomed into affection for one of the few means by
which Virginians could voice concerns, participate in official decision-making and vent frustrations. The imperial crisis of 1763 to 1776 witnessed the
jury's apotheosis as both a platform for popular participation and a key element in Revolutionary ideology. When Revolutionary governments reforged
the shards of the colonial order, republican principles privileged the jury in
unprecedented ways. Reformers burst the common law's fetters and installed
juries in courts of equity and admiralty, two bastions that had long abjured
juries. In criminal cases, the jury was given the power to sentence for many
offenses as well as to determine guilt or innocence. And building on colonial
practice, juries played an expanded role in public administration when they
decided not only the need for bridges and mills, but also in effect set the
salary for government officials by determining the price of tobacco.
In light of their sweep, their timing, and their purpose, these innovative uses of juries will be called the "Virginia experiment." 7 The experiment drew from the well-springs of radical resistance during the imperial
5. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (overruling twentyfive years of
precedent based on the Court's reconsideration of the founders' understanding of the Sixth
Amendment confrontation right).
6. John Murrin and A.G. Roeber, Trial by Jury: The Virginia Paradox (Parts I and 2), 34
VIRGINIA CAVALCADE 53, 118 (1984-85).

7. Historian Carl Ubbelohde fittingly uses the term "grand experiment" to describe
Virginia's innovative use of juries in admiralty jurisdiction. CARL UBBELOHDE, THE VICEADMIRALTY COURTS AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 195 (University of North Carolina
Press 1960).
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crisis and manifested itself as early as December 1775, some seven
months before the Declaration of Independence when Virginia authorized
juries to punish the "enemies to America." The core of the innovation,
however, was produced by Virginia's law reformers, especially Thomas
Jefferson, over the next four years.
As one examines the origins and contours of the experiment, the
principle theme that emerges is the deliberate, calculated politicization of
law, courts, and jury trials during the Revolutionary era. Nor was it merely rhetoric or ideological cant. Rather, ideas about juries and popular participation in government were institutionalizcd and played out in the daily
workings of the courts.
Perhaps not surprisingly, radical ideas that seemed well-placed in
times of tumult, crisis, and upheaval appeared less attractive in a calmer,
quieter period. By the late 1780s, many key elements of the "experiment"
had been undone, including trial by jury in equity and admiralty. The reasons for their rollback varied. Simple misgivings, procedural awkwardness, and concerns about the unpredictability and caprice of lay men from
the lower orders all played a role.
This article has three principle objectives. First, it will explore the
Virginia experiment as a dramatic, vastly under-appreciated, and mostly
unrecognized episode in American political and legal history.8 The article
will explain the elements of the Virginia experiment, why they should be
considered radically innovative, and their origins in the imperial crisis. In
short, one must qualify Akhil Amar's conclusion that trial by jury was a
"missed opportunity" for the Revolutionary generation. 9
Second, the story becomes more coherent if the focus is kept on the
experiment's prime mover, Thomas Jefferson, the quintessential democrat, radical leader, and enlightened law reformer. Jefferson championed
most of the reforms yet harbored misgivings about juries because they
could be beguiled and seduced by emotional, irrational appeals. More precisely, Jefferson's thought and actions manifested a palpable tension
between the value he placed on democracy and popular participation, on
the one side, and his worship of reason and enlightened certitude on the
other.10 The Virginia experiment, then, is an excellent vehicle for examining Jefferson's evolving ideas about democracy, law, republicanism, and
juries. As will be seen, Jefferson applauded and supported the expanded
use of juries in civil cases and for sentencing in various war-related
8. See Carl Ubbelohde, A Review of Courts of Admiralty in Colonial America: The
Maryland Experience, 1634-1776, by David R. Owen and Michael C. Tolley, 17 LAW & HIST.

REV. 408,410 (1999) (a book review that notes the authors' failure to appreciate the "significance of the whole experiment" as a "goodfaith response to the pre-Revolution unhappiness
with juryless trials"); Nancy King, The Origins of Felony Jury Sentencing in the United

States, 78 CHI.-KETr. L. REV. 937, 938 (which begins its consideration of Virginia practice in
the 1790s). See also UBBELOHDE, VICE-ADMIRALTY COURTS, supranote 7.
9. AKHIL AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 83-84, 243-44
(Yale University Press 1998).

10. See infra note 20 and accompanying text.
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offenses. Yet Jefferson also drafted a proposed "capital code" in which
juries played virtually no role in sentencing for most ordinary offenses.
And, more troublingly, how is one to understand Jefferson's wartime
attainder of Josiah Philips and his accomplices, a legislative decree of
death that dispensed with any resort to juries or judicial protection?, I
Third, this study of the politicization of law, trials, and juries may
help better explain some of the difficult hurdles that the "rule of law"
encountered in the early nineteenth century as it presented law as apolitical, scientific, and objective. 1 2 The difficulties and ambiguities are, again,
nicely embodied in Jefferson, who in 1798 proposed a solution to the
increasing politicization of law and courts, namely, the election of jurors,
whose "honest ignorance" he preferred to the "perverted science" of
biased judges. Jefferson's reasoning was tidy and compelling: if trials
were political events, jurors should be politically accountable.
In assessing these objectives, the article begins with Thomas
Jefferson's training and practice in law, during which he became intimately acquainted with the strengths and weaknesses of juries. Jefferson came
of age as a lawyer amidst the imperial crisis, during which he witnessed
firsthand the politicization of law, courts, and trials. Moreover, the "free
form" nature of the eighteenth-century trial, as exemplified by the celebrated Parson's Cause (1763), was the perfect incubator for overtly politicizing
the jury's role. These old-style trials featured juries virtually unbounded by
law or facts, literally free to decide cases for themselves. Their verdicts,
then, reflected the "general welfare" extolled by the First Continental
Congress in 1774.13 Yet, if the jury in the Parson's Cause embodied the
people's will in its (legally) perverse verdict against an Anglican cleric, it
simultaneously represented the triumph of emotion and caprice-and of
young Patrick Henry, Jefferson's later rival, who skillfully orchestrated the
verdict. Indeed, when Jefferson shuttered his law practice, he knew that he
lacked the skill and personality of gifted trial lawyers like Henry (the
"Homer of the spoken word"), who had the ability to manipulate and to
beguile trial juries. In short, trial by jury presented serious problems for
those, like Jefferson, who prized reasoned decision-making.
Next, the article assesses Jefferson's brilliant transition from indifferent lawyer to promising Revolutionary leader in 1774. Jefferson came
to the fore because of his powerful writing, reasoned analysis, and
advanced radical ideas, Jefferson's Summary View carefully traced the
colonies' vicissitudes during the imperial crisis and the need for bold
action. Among Britain's many sins was it evisceration of meaningful trial
by jury, for which Jefferson roundly and eloquently scorned imperial rule.
11.MERRILL PETERSON, THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE NEW NATION 46 (Oxford University
Press 1970) (Jefferson's thought was "eclectic, dynamic, and pragmatic," not systematic or
particularly consistent).
12. See WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE LOST WORLD OF CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT: LAW AND
IDEOLOGY IN AMERICA, 1886-1937 ch. I (Oxford University Press 1998).
13. See infra note 113 and accompanying text.
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Jefferson understood well the ideological saliency of trial by jury that
had been cultivated throughout the imperial crisis. Resistance leaders
politicized the jury in two senses. First, as seen by the Parson's Cause,
actual court cases could occasionally embody popular disapproval of
British rule. Second, as a potent symbol the jury right found its way into
countless pamphlets and the "court" of public opinion in the form of mock
jury trials that dramatized imperial injustice. By late 1775 pamphlets and
parades had given way to bloodshed and armed resistance from Virginia to
Massachusetts. In giving the "face of law" (George Mason's phrase) to the
Revolutionary committees and councils that governed the people amidst
the collapse of imperial rule, the Revolutionary leadership gave primacy to
juries in identifying and punishing the "enemies to America."
With the formal declaration of independence in the summer of 1776,
Americans quickly moved to install new state governments. The next section briefly canvasses the Virginia Declaration or Rights and constitution
of June 1776, with special attention paid to trial by jury. Jefferson, who
saw the new state governments as the "whole object" of the Revolution,
openly criticized Virginia's staid constitution and the failure to have it ratified by the people. Nonetheless, Virginia soon awarded Jefferson the
opportunity to effect widespread social, political, and legal change
through its justly celebrated law revision committee. Charged with the
task of conforming the commonwealth's laws to "our present circumstances," the committee, led by Jefferson, advanced some of the most farreaching legal reforms in American history, including the abolition of
entail and primogeniture. The committee also proposed key elements of
the Virginia experiment, radically extending trial by jury into equity and
admiralty actions as well as expanding the jury's power to punish offenders who impeded the war effort. Functioning as a peoples' court, of sorts,
juries played important roles in public administration outside the bounds
of lawsuits or even trials. The experiment's overriding objective, especially evident where juries were used to decide "policy" issues (e.g., official
salaries) outside the confines of traditional lawsuits, was to build popular
legitimacy for the Revolutionary cause through the common-law jury.
Within ten years, however, the experiment was largely undone, particularly in equity and admiralty. The jury's expanded role remained solely
within the domain of criminal law, ironically, the one area where
Jefferson worked hardest to restrict it.
Jefferson himself ultimately valued the Enlightenment's pursuit of
reason more than the virtues of occasionally impulsive, somewhat emotional, and generally uninformed decisions by juries. Two episodes illustrate this critical facet of Jefferson's thinking. Among his most precious
law reforms was the proposed capital code, an enlightenment centerpiece
of reason and science that precisely calculated the punishment for nearly
all serious criminal offenses. And having done the calculations himself,
Jefferson saw virtually no role for juries despite their use in sentencing
offenders for war-related crimes. While Jefferson contemplated his capital
code, which never became law, he implemented its terrible logic in the
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attainder against the loyalist brigand and robber, Josiah Philips. The
Philips attainder, instigated and drafted by Jefferson, dispensed not only
with a jury, but with a court and trial altogether. Moreover, this legislative
edict of death reached all who supported Philips. In sum, convinced of
Philips' guilt, Jefferson guided Virginia's legislature toward a single, inexorable, chillingly rational solution: death to Philips and his supporters.
The final section concludes with Jefferson's later reflections on trials, juries, and their innately political character. In his popular and
remarkably prescient Notes on Virginia, written in the 1780s, Jefferson
hardly extolled the jury as a "palladium" of liberty when he described its
decisions as decidedly better than that of a biased judge but only marginally superior to the chance of the "cross and pile"-the eighteenth-century
coin flip. Nor did time soften his views. Jefferson's 1798 proposal for the
election of jurors simply assumed the political nature of trials and the
judiciary.' 4 Beleaguered and besieged by Federalist attacks and war hysteria, he portrayed the jury as a safeguard of sorts against "biased" (mostly Federalist) judges and an instance where "honest ignorance would be
safer than perverted science." Thus, capable of little more than "honest
ignorance," and apparently incapable of sustained reasoned decision-making, jurors should be politically accountable at the polls.
Since the Supreme Court looks to the historical record when construing the Bill of Rights,' 5 the conclusion emphasizes that future cases must
grapple with the founders' divided mindset toward juries. The Revolution
marked the jury's apotheosis as a political agency, yet the record is also
one of retrenchment borne, in part, of concerns about political accountability and capacity for reasoned judgment. Most important, in form and
function the trial itself has evolved into a radically different institution
than the one found in eighteenth-century North America.
JEFFERSON AND EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY TRIALS
Jefferson: Student and Lawyer
Thomas Jefferson practiced law from February 1767 until August
1774, when the Revolution propelled him into the roles of radical leader,
republican statesman, and law reformer. Those seven-plus years of law
practice coincided with the quickening of the imperial crisis and the
advent of the Revolution, experiences that profoundly shaped Jefferson's
thinking about politics, law, and juries. Yet his education and training
before 1767 undoubtedly created the cast of mind through which he
understood those experiences. More precisely, Jefferson entered the study
and practice of law with the benefit of an "enlightened," liberal education
14. Jefferson may have been inspired by the New England practice of nominating grand
jurors at town meetings. See JOHN C. MILLER, ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 287
(Stanford University Press 1959) (1943).
15. See Crawford v. Washington, supra note 5.
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which placed a premium on order, reason, science, and steadfast improvement. Nothing about Jefferson's personality or experience as a lawyer
suggests that he was particularly adept at trying cases before juries or nurtured more than a polite, lawyerly respect for this venerable, yet unpredictable institution. Indeed, Jefferson's legal career introduced him to the
roles played by caprice and emotion in decision-making while also cultivating a wariness of those who successfully, skillfully manipulated popular opinion.
For a Virginia lawyer born and bred, Jefferson was well-educated for
his time. Although his father lacked formal education. Jefferson was
placed in an "English school" at age 5 and studied at the "Latin" school at
age 9, where he also learned French. When Jefferson's father died in
1757, fourteen-year-old Thomas was sent to live with the Reverend James
Maury, a "classical scholar," until his admission to the College of William
and Mary in 1760.16 At the college, Jefferson had the "great good fortune" to study under Dr. William Small, "who probably fixed the destinies
of [his] life." 17 Small, who had recently come from Scotland, was a welleducated, demanding, and engaging teacher, "the first truly enlightened or
scientific man" young Jefferson had met. 18 Indeed, since the, enlightened
Scotsman was the only regular teacher on the faculty for a time (the other
teacher had been removed for "rowdyism"1 9), he taught Jefferson virtually the entire curriculum of mathematics, natural philosophy, natural history, ethics, rhetoric, logic, and belles letters. 20 Jefferson credited Small
with providing "my first views of the expansion of science & of the system of things in which we are placed." 2 1 In short, Small ignited
Jefferson's life-long pursuit of reason, precision, and order in all things.
And it was Small who arranged for Jefferson to study law under the tute22
lage of one of Virginia's finest lawyers and legal minds, George Wythe.
Eighteenth-century lawyers were trained in law offices, not law
schools. Standardized legal education would not rear its head until well
into the nineteenth century. The erstwhile law student of Revolutionary
times typically sought out a local lawyer under whom he might serve as a
type of apprentice, watching his mentor represent clients, drafting documents under supervision, and "reading" at least some law, although usual16. THOMAS JEFFERSON, AUTOBIOGRAPHY 4 (1821) (Library of America 1984). Jefferson

Wrote the Autobiography at age 77. Id. at 3.
17. Id. at 4.
18. PETERSON, supra note 11, at 12. Later in life, Jefferson glowingly described his
esteemed teacher as "a man profound in most of the useful branches of science, with a happy
talent of communication, correct and gentlemanly manners, & an enlarged & liberal mind."
JEFFERSON, AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 16, at 4.
19. PETERSON, supra note 11, at 12 (describing Small, Jefferson's curriculum, and the
removal of the other teacher for unspecified "rowdyism").
20. JEFFERSON, AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 16, at 4. See also PETERSON, supra note I1, at
12.
21. JEFFERSON, AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 16, at 4.
22. Id. at 4.
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ly in a haphazard, scattershot manner.
Jefferson was extraordinarily fortunate to study, at least for a time,
under Wythe, "my faithful and beloved Mentor in youth, and my most
affectionate friend through life." 24 Wythe, an accomplished lawyer, later
signed the Declaration of Independence, served as the first professor of
law at William and Mary, and became Virginia's first chancellor of equity. 25 Largely self-taught, Wythe commanded the intricacies of Roman and
English law while also having mastered classical languages and humanistic literature. As historian Merrill Peterson observed, Dr. Small cultivated
Jefferson's proclivities toward scientific rationalism while Wythe taught
26
him to understand law through the ancients and the humanities.
Jefferson spent about five years watching lawyers at practice and
reading law. 27 Wythe guided his study early on, but family responsibilities at the Shadwell farms in Albemarle County soon compelled Jefferson
to read extensively on his own. 28 Although deprived of Wythe's direct
influence, the change freed Jefferson to learn law on his own and to bring
to it his own peculiar interests and understanding. 29 Much of the selfstudy was undoubtedly tedious, difficult, and prolonged by Jefferson's
duties on the farms and youthful pursuit of romance. 30 While battling
through Sir Edward Coke's Institutes of the Laws of England, he wrote his
good friend, John Page, that "I do wish the Devil had old Cooke [Coke],
for I am sure that I never was so tired of an old dull scoundrel in
my life."31 Yet Coke instilled in Jefferson a deep appreciation for understanding law through history, especially the common law's Saxon

23.

LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 2D ED. 97-102 (Simon &

Schuster 1985).
24. JEFFERSON, AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 16, at 4.

25. PETERSON, supra note II, at 14.
26. Id. at 14-15. While in Williamsburg, Jefferson closely associated with the witty,
learned, and engaging triumvirate of Small, Wythe, and Governor Fauquier. Peterson
describes this "Williamsburg circle" as "Jefferson's university." Id. at 15.
27. For general accounts of Jefferson's education as a lawyer, I have relied upon
PETERSON, supra note 11, at 16-20 and FRANK L. DEWEY, THOMAS JEFFERSON: LAWYER 9-17
(University Press of Virginia 1986). Dewey disputes the traditional position that Jefferson
spent about five years as a law student, but the fact remains that Jefferson did not begin law
practice until 1767. Besides his demanding reading program, Jefferson wrote of attending
court "constantly." Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Page (7 October 1763), in I THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON Il (Julian P. Boyd ed., Princeton University Press 1950)
(hereinafter, "I PTJ").
28. In 1769 Jefferson declined to take on his first cousin as a legal apprentice, stating that
"I was always of the opinion that the placing a youth to study with an attorney was rather a
prejudice than a help" if only because lawyers pushed their "business" on students whose
time was better spent in study. Letter from Jefferson to Thomas Turpin (5 February 1769) in
I PTJ, supra note 27, at 24.
29. Dewey sets forth a chronology of Jefferson's likely course of self-education between
1762 and 1767. DEWEY, supra note 27, at 17.
30. PETERSON, supra note 11, at 19.
31. Letter from Jefferson to John Page (25 December 1762) in I PTJ, supra note 27, at 5.
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(pre-Norman) roots. 32 Indeed, it appears that Jefferson continued to read
widely in history and humanities while studying legal texts. 33
It seems, then, that the eclectic and idiosyncratic nature of
Jefferson's legal education, building as it did on Small's broadly
Enlightened curriculum and Wythe's wide-ranging interests, led him to
approach "law as a branch of the history of mankind." 34 One senses nothing resembling a "love" for lawyering itself or a burning desire to gain
preeminence at the bar, especially in the theatre of trial by jury. Rather, it
appears that Jefferson saw law practice as a way to supplement his
income from agriculture while being of some use to society. 35
Modest as his ambition may have been, Jefferson in 1767 nonetheless gained admission to the small but distinguished group of lawyers
licensed to practice before the General Court, colonial Virginia's highest
court of law and equity. 36 Before the Revolution, Virginia lawyers were
technically compelled to choose between a local practice in the county
courts or one before the General Court.37 Although a county court practice may have been more financially rewarding, Jefferson seemingly
never wavered in his desire for the General Court's ranks. A decade later,
writing to his mentor Wythe, himself among the leading lawyers of
Virginia's highest court, Jefferson praised the General Court as an "excellent nursery for future judges" and its lawyers as "men of science." In
stark contrast stood the county court lawyers, an "inundation of insects"
best excluded from the august General Court lest they "consume the harvest." 38 Although harsh and disdainful, Jefferson's judgment rested on his
intimate acquaintance with the county courts' workings. In 1766 he was
appointed a justice of the peace in the Albemarle County court and also
frequented the sessions of the neighboring Augusta County court in pursuit of cases .39
Jefferson's law practice consisted mostly of land-related litigation
involving petitions and caveats, actions that involved challenges to land
patents although in different forums. 40 Caveats were heard by the
Governor's Council (12 prominent men) and petitions were decided by
32. PETERSON, supra note 11,at 17-18.

33. See DEWEY, supra note 27, at 14.
34. PETERSON, supra note II, at 14.
35. Id. at 12-13.
36. Only about eight (8) lawyers were admitted to practice before the General Court. See
DEWEY, supra note 27, at 2-3.
37. See id. at ch. 3 and Appendix B (dispelling the "myth" that Jefferson actually practiced law before the county courts as well as the General Court).
38. id. at 124-25, quoting Jefferson to Wythe (I March 1779) which is required at 2 THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 235 (Julian P. Boyd ed., Princeton University Press 1950)
(hereinafter, "2 PTFJ").
39. DEWEY, supra note 27, at ch. 4. The county courts met in quarterly sessions which
Jefferson regularly attended.
40. Id. at 30.
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the General Court (the Council plus the governor sitting as a "court"). 4 1 In

essence, a petition alleged that a current patent holder forfeited any right
to the land by failing to pay quitrents or to make required improvements.4 2 A caveat attacked an application for a patent on grounds that the
challenger had a superior claim or the applicant had not followed the correct procedures. 43 Neither procedure used juries.
Jefferson and Old-Style Trials
Before addressing Jefferson's experiences as a trial lawyer before
juries, it is helpful to remark briefly on the nature of eighteenth-century
jury trials.44 Such trials were short and, by present standards, remarkably
informal in the truest sense of the word. Parties often presented no "evidence" in the form of testimony. (Rules of evidence played virtually no
role in the proceedings.) Verdicts were often based on argument and the
jury's knowledge of local events and the parties' character. The jury itself
was usually drawn from "bystanders," who often included other parties
waiting to have their cases called or "idlers" hoping to earn a modest fee
for their services. Many jurors-and sometimes the same jury-might
hear multiple cases in a single day. Decisions were quick; often the jury
never deliberated or even left the courtroom, but rather rendered its verdict after a short huddle from where it sat. Indeed, typical jury trials may
45
have lasted no more than a few minutes.
The celebrated "Parson's Cause" of 1763 provides a trenchant illustration of this old-style trial and its capacity for nullification, and one
which Jefferson would have been acutely aware of given its notoriety and
his own personal connections. 46 The dispute had its origins in the TwoPenny Act of 1758, a debt relief measure that permitted payments of debts
and taxes in currency at the rate of two pence per pound of tobacco at a
time when tobacco's market value was nearly triple that amount. 47
Among those hard hit were the local Anglican clergy, which saw its salary
41. Id. at 18, 21-22. Multiple office holding, although alien to modem law and politics,
was a common eighteenth-century feature. See Daniel D. Blinka, Trial by Jury in
Revolutionary Virginia: Old-Style Trials in the New Republic 49-50 (2001) (unpublished
PhD dissertation, University of Wisconsin-Madison) (hereinafter, "Revolutionary
Virginia").
42. DEWEY, supra note 27, at 30.
43. Id. at 30.
44. See Daniel D. Blinka, Trial by Jury on the Eve of Revolution: The Virginia
Experience, 71 UMKC L. REV. 529 (2003); "This Germ of Rottedness": Federal Trials in
the New Republic, 1789-1807,36 CREIGHTON L. REV. 135 (2003).
45. See Blinka, Trial by Jury on the Eve of Revolution, supra note 44, at 562-80.

46. There are no records of Jefferson's thoughts on the Parson's Cause, If any existed, they
were most probably destroyed in the fire at Jefferson's Shadwell plantation in February 1770.
See Letter by Jefferson to John Page (21 February 1770), I PTJ, supra note 27, at 34-36.
47. Blinka, Revolutionary Virginia, supra note 41, at 154-56. Tobacco receipts served as

Virginia's currency in the cash-starved eighteenth-century economy.
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effectively reduced by two-thirds. 48 In 1760, the King in Council formally
disallowed the 1758 act. 49 A number of Anglican ministers then brought
legal actions seeking redress (backpay), including the Reverend James
Maury, with whom Jefferson had studied until 1760.50 Maury brought his
suit against Thomas Johnson, who was responsible for collecting the
parish taxes and paying Maury. Since Johnson also sat on the Louisa
County Court and represented that county in the House of Burgesses (the
colonial legislature), Maury's able lawyer, the distinguished Peter Lyon,
filed the action in neighboring Hanover County. In November 1763 the
Hanover justices of the peace ruled that the Two Penny Act was void
from its inception and that Maury was therefore entitled to back pay. The
court ordered that a "select" jury be impaneled to determine damages at
its December sitting.51
The December jury trial should have been a straightforward calculation that simply subtracted whatever payment Maury actually received
from what he was owed. Undoubtedly hoping to avoid such an outcome,
Johnson retained a new attorney for trial, the young Patrick Henry. Henry
had already gained a budding reputation for his forensic skills. Decades
later, in one of his kindest remarks about Henry, an envious Jefferson
gently praised him as the "Homer" of the spoken word. 52 Yet eloquence
aside, Henry's presence may have also been calculated to offset that of his
father, who sat on the Hanover court and had ruled against Johnson in
November. 53 The change of counsel paid the desired dividends.
Although the Parson's Cause is often celebrated as a harbinger of
Revolutionary sentiment, 54 it more clearly illustrates the working of the
"old-style trial," which attempted to institutionalize a preference for a
hierarchically organized society. 55 In such trials "character" loomed large
because it helped fix one's place in local society. Although the court's
order for a "select" jury was intended to identify the "better" sort of men,
Maury bitterly observed that the jury was drawn from "among the vulgar
48. See Arthur P. Scott, The Constitutional Aspects of the "Parson's Cause, " 31
POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY 558-77 (Dec. 1916) at http://dinsdoc.com/Scotn-l.html. A

1748 act fixed the annual salary of Virginia's Anglican clergy at 16,000 pounds of tobacco.
The Debt Relief Act of 1758 permitted all debts payable in tobacco for that year to be paid
in currency at the rate of two pence per pound. The 1758 act anticipated a crop failure, yet
the market price of tobacco swelled to six pence, so debtors naturally took advantage of the
act topay their debts cheaply. Id. at 560.
49. See id. at 560-61.
50. For Jefferson and Maury, see supra note 16 and accompanying text. See also
PETERSON, supra note 11, at 8-9. The "constitutional" aspects of the Parson's Cause cases
are explored by Scott, supra note 48.
51. Blinka, Revolutionary Virginia, supra note 41, at 156.
52. JEFFERSON, AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 16, at6.

53. See Blinka, Revolutionary Virginia, supra note 41, at 156-57 (noting that Lyon
reportedly enjoyed listening to Henry's arguments).
54. See Scott, supra note 48, at 559.
55. See Blinka, Trial by Jury on the Eve of Revolution, supra note 44, at 557.
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herd" and included several evangelicals and religious dissidents, men
unlikely to side with an Anglican clergymen. 56 Besides the centrality of
character, the trial featured little in the way of formal evidence. Lyons
called just two witnesses, experienced tobacco dealers who set the market
rate for tobacco. Henry offered only a single piece of paper: Maury's
signed receipt for the £144 he received as salary. 57 In short, much of the
"proof' was already known by the jurors before the trial began or was
provided by the lawyers during argument. Lyon's emphasized the respect
that the community owed its Anglican clergy (not a particularly compelling point) and urged it to perform the simple calculation. Rising for
the defense, Henry quickly slipped the shackles of law and played to the
jury's emotion. Henry colorfully vilified the clergy as "'rapacious
harpies' who would 'snatch from the hearth of their honest parishioners
his last hoe-cake."' 58 He also tip-toed treason by castigating the king's
disallowance of the 1758 act. In conclusion, Henry urged the jury not to
award more than a "farthing" in damages. 59 The jury briefly filed out of
the courtroom and returned immediately with a verdict that set damages at
just one penny! The many onlookers greeted the one-penny finding with
such explosive approval that the panel of justices prudently denied Lyons
60
motion to set aside the verdict.
In short, the Parson's Cause typified the old-style trial's reliance on
character, its utter lack of evidentiary rules, and an almost startling informality of proof which pragmatically equated witness testimony, the jury's
own knowledge, and counsel's argument. Nor was the jury "bound"-even
as a fiction-to follow the judges' instructions on law. Indeed, the judges
and lawyers might well provide inconsistent versions of law, as did Henry
and Lyon, thereby leaving the jury with a range of choices, including that of
following its own lead. "Deliberations" or reasoned decision-making was
not the primary objective. Quick verdicts were prized and many Virginia
juries delivered their decision without leaving the box. The one-penny finding was also typical, embodying a grudging recognition of the plaintiff's
"rights" with an abject refusal to penalize financially the defendant. 6 1 Even
more so than modern jury trials, the eighteenth-century trial favored
lawyers who were persuasive, articulate, reacted well on their feet, and
who, above all, had the ability to a read and respond to the feelings,
62
thoughts, and emotions of the more common sort who comprised juries.
The old-style trial, then, accommodated if not institutionalized nullification.
56. Maury's quotes are taken from HENRY MAYER, A SON OF THUNDER: PATRICK HENRY
AND THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 63 (University Press of Virginia 1991). One juror had "publicly damned Parson Henry [Patrick's uncle] as an unconverted wretch." Id.

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id. at 63.
As quoted in id. at 54.
Id. at65.
Id. at 65-66.
See Blinka, Trial by Jury on the Eve of Revolution, supra note 44, at 579.
Mid eighteenth-century society valued face-to-face contact. See RHYS

TRANSFORMATION OF VIRGINIA, 1740-1790 ch. 5 (Norton 1982).
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And how well did Thomas Jefferson perform in such an environment? The record is ambiguous and incomplete yet fair inferences may be
drawn. Jefferson focused his practice, as we have seen, on the General
Court where he specialized in technical land litigation. And although he
tried jury trials, it is difficult to say how many, identify his role as cocounsel, or adequately assess Jefferson's performance before the jury. 63
To be sure Jefferson earns high marks for diligence, preparation, mastery
of law, and analytic skills, yet it seems doubtful that his personality and
"communication skills" were particularly well-suited to the old-style trial.
First, someone of Jefferson's personality and temperament would
not have been at ease in thc free-wheeling swirl of eighteenth-century trials. Historian Merrill Peterson, Jefferson's leading biographer, describes
him at age 30 as a man of "forebearance and reserve," a careful thinker
who prized "reason and inquiry" and displayed "a penchant for methodical industry, order and system." 64 Another historian, Joseph Ellis, discerned in Jefferson "a reclusive pattern of behavior with distinctive psychological implications," a man with "an extremely private temperament." 65 In short, Jefferson the scholarly introvert would not have been
playing to his strengths when looking jurors in the eye and attempting to
sway them with the spoken word. As Peterson so bluntly put it, Jefferson
"was not, in his nature, born for the public." 66
This in turn relates to a second telling limitation: historians concur
that despite his protean talents, Jefferson was a poor public speaker. In his
classic study of the Declaration of Independence, Carl Becker famously
observed that Jefferson seldom made speeches throughout his political
career because "[l]ike many men who write with felicity, Jefferson was no
orator." 67 In the same vein and writing of Jefferson's "marginal" contri63. Dewey is the closest student of Jefferson the lawyer. His research discloses
Jefferson's role in a number of jury trials but does not tabulate the number of cases tried or
evaluate Jefferson's skills as a trial lawyer. See especially DEWEY, supra note 27, at ch. 4
(discussing Jefferson's appointment to assist Edmund Pendleton on the "eve" of an assault
trial) and ch. 6 (which recounts Jefferson's involvement in the Norfolk anti-inoculation riot
trials).
64. PETERSON, supra note 11, at 30-31. Born in 1743, the 30-year-old Jefferson was at the
crest of his legal career before giving up practice later in 1774.
65. JOSEPH J. ELLIS, AMERICAN SPHINX: THE CHARACTER OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 39
(Random House 1996).
66. PETERSON, supra note 11, at 30.
67. CARL BECKER, THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE: A STUDY IN THE HISTORY OF
POLITICAL IDEAS 194 (Vintage Books 1958) (1922). Becker let Jefferson off the hook, so to
speak, by further generalizing that the qualities of effective speaking and writing seldom
coincide in the same individual:
It might seem that a man who can write effectively should be able to speak effectively. It
sometimes happens. But one whose ear is sensitive to the subtler, elusive harmonies of
expression, one who in imagination hears the pitch and cadence and rhythm of the thing he
wishes before he says it, often makes a sad business of public speaking because, painfully
aware of the imperfect felicity of what he has uttered, he forgets what he ought to say next.
He instinctively wishes to cross out what he has just said, and say it over again in a different way-and this is what he often does, to the confusion of the audience. In writing he can
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butions to the Continental Congress, historian Ellis also cited this inabili68
ty-"He could not speak in public"-as his "most glaring deficiency."
Peterson also remarks on Jefferson's "deficiencies" as a speaker, yet con69
cludes that Jefferson "acquitted himself respectably" as a lawyer.
Indeed, Jefferson's focus on petitions and caveats permitted him to draw
before
upon his keen intelligence and immense learning when appearing 70
the General Court and the Council-essentially, the same persons. It is
tempting to speculate that Jefferson may have eschewed a potentially
more lucrative county court practice precisely because it demanded those
skills that Jefferson most lacked.
Third, Jefferson's very emphasis on reason, learning, and scholarly
detachment were not the strengths of a trial lawyer. Comparing Jefferson
arid Henry as lawyers, Peterson concludes that Jefferson's "superiority of
learning was canceled by Henry's golden throat and folksy ways[.]" 7l
And those "folksy ways" often conflicted with reasoned argument. In
1773 Jefferson played a modest role in the infamous Blair divorce scandal
that rocked Williamsburg society. Watching the oral argument by Patrick
Henry, Jefferson observed that Henry "'avoided, as was his custom, entering the lists of the law, running wild in the field of fact."' 72 The phrase is
telling. Henry's "running wild in the field of facts" connotes the very
antithesis of the reason, precision, and orderliness valued by one who felt
more at home in the "lists of the law."
Lessons Learned
In August 1774 Thomas Jefferson turned over the bulk of his law
practice to Edmund Randolph, although his plans to retain the caveat
73
cases were quickly washed away by the tidal surges of the Revolution.
It is difficult to explain Jefferson's decision to forsake lawyering and
assume a role among Virginia's radical leadership. Merrill Peterson
observes that Jefferson was "remarkably inarticulate about the processes
of thought that conducted him to the revolutionary event," perhaps
because "[t]heir channels were intricate, devious, and partly hidden from
cross out and rewrite at leisure, as often as he likes, until the sound and the sense are perfectly suited-until the thing composes. The reader sees only the finished draft.

Id. at 195 (emphasis original).
68. ELLIS, supra note 65, at 42. Political influence in the eighteenth century depended to a
great extent on public speaking skills. Ellis observes that the "elevated status of the Virginia
delegation derived primarily from its reputations for oratorical brilliance." Id. at 43.
69. PETERSON, supra note 11,at 21. Peterson notes that Jefferson's "deficiencies" as a
speaker were "often noted in later years." Id.
70. Patrick Henry retained Jefferson to handle a caveat matter on his behalf. See DEWEY,
supra note 27, at ch.4.
71. PETERSON, supra note I I, at 20-21.
72. Quoted in DEWEY, supra note 27, at 63.
73. Id. at 108. Dewey concludes that Jefferson intended to retain the caveat practice
because the cases were fairly straightforward, paid well, and were heard by the Council.
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consciousness." 74 It may be, however, that the two decisions were unrelated. Put differently, Jefferson may have abandoned law practice regardless
of the Revolution, its fortuitous timing serving as a convenient justification
for one who struggled to make a living as a lawyer and who lacked talents
essential for success at the bar. 75 Yet in many ways, Jefferson's deepening
as we
devotion to radical politics was a natural transition for one who,
76
have seen, "learned law as a branch of the history of mankind."
Law practice in general, and jury trials in particular, undoubtedly
provided Jefferson with trenchant lessons that deeply influenced his views
on the Revolution and rcpublican government. First, law was becoming
politicized. It cannot be gainsaid that the years of his legal education and
law practice coincided with the imperial crisis. To the young law student,
the Parson's Cause embodied law as politics. Henry's victory took the
form of a one-penny finding, an act of defiance expressed in the venerable
raiment of the common-law verdict. The Hanover court, clearly intimidated by the verdict's vocal, popular support, let it stand despite the verdict's
shaky legal moorings. Years later, Jefferson saw firsthand the politicization of law in a less flattering light as a lawyer in the Norfolk anti-inoculation riot cases, where he represented the "enlightened" supporters of
inoculation who had been damaged by "mobs" and persecuted by local
77
officials who feared this novel medical technique.
A second lesson followed closely from the first: the danger that
biased judges and capricious juries might decides cases based on emotion
and irrational impulses, not reason or the law. As we will see, Jefferson
struggled for decades to reconcile his enthusiasm for popular decisionmaking with fears about the public's capacity to act rationally. Nothing
emerges from Jefferson's experience as a lawyer which suggested that jury
verdicts were uniformly, or generally, a superior method of dispute resolution, particularly where reason and science pointed to a certain answer.
Yet a third lesson may have been the most galling and chilling of all:
the substantial risk posed by those with the gift to manipulate, to shape, or
to influence popular opinions. Skillful trial lawyers, like Patrick Henry,
employed their "golden throats" and "folksy ways" to beguile juries
through emotion, sentiment, and an appeal to the irrational. Despite his
74. PETERSON, supra note II,at 45.

75. See DEWEY, supra note 27, at ch. 11.Dewey reasonably speculates that Jefferson lost
interest in the law as early as May 1773, when he inherited substantial property from his
father-in-law and became more interested in horticulture and the building of Monticello. If
Dewey is correct, these are far less compelling reasons and underscore Jefferson's deep disenchantment with-or lack of commitment to-law practice. In any event, a decision to
invest himself in the radical cause did not foreclose him from practicing law. The two activities were not mutually exclusive, as the career of George Wythe well illustrates.
76. PETERSON, supra note II, at 14.
77. See DEWEY, supra note 27, at ch. 6. Jefferson favored inoculation and found himself
aligned against a Norfolk "mob" that opposed it out of fear, ignorance, and superstition.
Dewey's account emphasizes the formal legal issues and ignores its political implications,
but duly notes Jefferson's exasperation with biased judges and jurors. Some likened the
Norfolk anti-inoculation mob with those that opposed the Stamp Act. Id. at 52.
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skill with the pen and the written word, Jefferson knew that eighteenthcentury law required lawyers to be adept practitioners in an oral culture
premised upon face-to-face communications. 78 And because the same values animated political culture, Jefferson's experiences shaped his later
thinking not just about juries, but also the nature of the republic and the
law under which it was governed.
JEFFERSON AND THE COMING OF THE REVOLUTION
In July 1774 Jefferson closed his law practice and entered the lists of
Revolutionary leadership. In contrast to the "Homeric" Henry, whose personal magnetism and speaking skills marked him for leadership, the taciturn, reflective Jefferson produced a tightly reasoned, persuasively written
reflection on the causes of the imperial crisis, the colonies' grievances,
and a course of action. The so-called "Summary View" also contains
glimpses into Jefferson's first pronounced thoughts about the foundations
of government and ruminations about the role of trial by jury, the latter a
clearly subordinate concern. Both the Summary View and Jefferson's
abandonment of law practice must be understood in terms of the incipient
political maelstrom.
The Summary View traversed the principle features of the "imperial
crisis," a term that aptly describes the swelling political reaction in North
America to the host of imperial "reforms" that followed Britain's 1763
victory in the French and Indian War. 79 Its high-water marks are wellknown. 80 Throughout most of the long colonial period, English (British)
rule was, to put it generously, relatively lax and often to the colonies' benefit.81 The costly victory over France, however, forced Britain to rethink
and then to overhaul its relationship with its North American colonies,
which now included Canada. The Proclamation Act of 1763 vainly
attempted to curb settlement west of the Appalachians and thereby avoid
costly Indians wars. 82 The Sugar Act of 1764 sought both to raise revenue
and to protect British West Indies planters by lowering the duty on sugar,
which Britain now intended to collect. Neither act triggered much colonial
78. See ISAAC, supra note 62.

79. See FRED

ANDERSON, THE CRUCIBLE OF WAR: THE SEVEN YEARS' WAR AND THE FATE

OF EMPIRE IN BRITISH NORTH AMERICA, 1754-1766 (Knopf 2000). Although the conflict in

North America is commonly called the "French and Indian War," Anderson compellingly
demonstrates that it was a world war for imperial domination, fought in the Caribbean, India,
and Europe, and on the oceans.
80. See generally MILLER, supra note 14; LAWRENCE H. GIPSON, THE COMING OF THE
REVOLUTION: 1763-1775 (Harper Row 1954).

81. Even the trade and commercial restrictions were mostly benign or helped contribute
to the economic growth of British North America. See JOHN J. MCCUSKER & RUSSELL R.
MENARD, THE ECONOMY OF BRITISH NORTH AMERICA: 1607-1789 50 n. 20 (University of

North Carolina Press 1991). See also

OLIVER DICKERSON, THE NAVIGATION ACTS AND THE

AMERICAN REVOLUTION (A.S. Barnes 1963) (1951).

82. "Pontiac's Rebellion" also raged on the frontier in 1763. MILLER, supra note 14, at
74-75.
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response; indeed, the Sugar Act's impact was confined largely to New
England and its rum trade. 83 The Stamp Act, however, sparked the first
real flashpoint because it was a revenue measure that touched all North
American colonies and kindled outrage among influential groups such as
lawyers and printers. 84 Most damnable was its effectiveness: the relatively
modest stamp tax was virtually self-enforcing because newspapers and
legal documents could only use the hated-stamped paper. Colonial resistance was organized, intense, and effective. Orchestrated "riots" in Boston
and New York coincided with unabashed intimidation of Stamp Act collectors throughout the co!onies. 85 Britain repealed the act before its effective date but simultaneously announced the Declaratory Act, which
affirmed Britain's right to govern its colonies as it saw fit. So began the
pattern of "doing and undoing" as colonial resistance caused Britain to
back down repeatedly. 86 The Townshend Duties of 1767 triggered colonial boycotts and escalating resistance culminating in the Boston
Massacre of 1770, after which Parliament repealed nearly all duties,
except those on tea. Several years of relative calm ended abruptly when
Parliament's ill-conceived plan to salvage the East India Company resulted in the Boston Tea Party of December 1773. Exasperated, Britain
imposed the "Coercive Acts" on Boston in early 1774 in the vain hope of
delimiting further resistance, but these so-called "Intolerable Acts"
sparked outrage and protest throughout North America. 87 In sum, the
"imperial crisis" consisted of increasing colonial resistance to Britain's
varied attempts to impose increased hegemony over North America, culminating in the pitched battles of 1775 and independence in 1776.
The Summary View by no means marked Jefferson's first interest or
involvement in radical politics. Elected to the House of Burgesses in
1768,88 Jefferson signed Virginia's Nonimportation Association of 1770
which protested the Townshend Duties and sanctioned county committees
to police the boycott's effectiveness. 89 When news of the Intolerable Acts
broke over North America in May 1774, Jefferson helped galvanize popular protest and resistance. The "Fast Day Resolution," signed on May 24,
1774, declared that at 10 a.m. on June 1 members of the House of
83. Id. at 105.
84. EDMUND S. MORGAN AND HELEN M. MORGAN, THE STAMP ACT CRISIS: PROLOGUE TO

REVOLUTION 175 (lawyers), 195 (printers) (University of North Carolina Press, 1995)
(1953).
85. For Virginia mobs, see id. at 189.
86. 1 DAVID RAMSEY, THE HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 118 (Trenton 1811),

as quoted in MILLER, supra note 14, at 294.
87. The "Intolerable" or "Coercive Acts" are described at MILLER, supra note 14, at 369-76.
88. ELLIS, supra note 65, at 31. As Ellis explains, Jefferson's election manifested his
political ambition and growing reputation among Virginia's aristocracy.
89. Virginia Nonimportation Resolutions (1770), reprinted in, I PTJ, supra note 27, at
43-47. The association contemplated that local committees of 5 men would inspect goods
and enforce the boycott by demanding records, where necessary. Violators would be subject
to public censure.
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Burgesses would "proceed with the Speaker and the Mace to the Church"
where they would "implore the divine Interposition for averting the heavy
Calamity, which threatens Destruction to our civil Rights, and the Evils of
civil war[.]"90 Jefferson later explained that the Resolution deliberately
drew upon the precedents of the Puritan Revolution of the 1640s with the
intent of "arousing our people from the lethargy into whey they had fallen
as to passing events." 91 After the Governor dissolved the House of
Burgesses, its members gathered in the Apollo Room of the Raleigh
Tavern and formed an "association" on May 27, 1774.92 The association
protested the tax on tea and the "attack" on Massachusetts by advocating
a boycott of East India commodities (except spices and saltpeter) and calling for a "general congress" among the colonies. 93 In anticipation of a
colonial congress, a rump of twenty-five "late" members of the House,
including Jefferson, called for a gathering of representatives from across
Virginia on August 1 for purposes of instructing the Old Dominion's delegates. 94 Of particular significance here is the genuine, recurring concern
by Jefferson and the radical leadership both to shape and to draw upon
popular support. Later in his life, Jefferson reflected that the assemblies of
June 1 (the "fast" day) were "like a shock of electricity, arousing every
95
man and placing him erect and solidly on his centre."
Jefferson hoped that the Summary View would affect (if not embody)
the thoughts and actions of the August 1774 Convention as well as
instruct its delegates to the First Continental Congress. 96 Dysentery disabled Jefferson from attending the Convention himself, but he sent copies
to Peyton Randolph, its likely chairman, and Patrick Henry. 97 Although
delegates discussed the Summary View and "applauded" much of it, the
Convention ultimately did not adopt the proposed instructions. 9 8
Nonetheless, it influenced early thinking about resistance in Virginia and
at the First Continental Congress, marked Jefferson's entrance into the
ranks of the radical leadership, and fully justified his later charge to draft
the Declaration of Independence in June 1776.99
90. Resolution of the House of Burgesses Designating A Day of Fasting and Prayer,
reprinted in id. at 105-106.
91. JEFFERSON, AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 16, at 8.
92. Id.
93. Association of Members of the Late House of Burgesses, reprintedin id. at 107-08.
94. Proceedings of a Meeting of Representatives in Williamsburg (30 May 1774),
reprinted in id. at 109- 10.
95. JEFFERSON, AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 16, at 8.

96. 1 PTJ, supranote 27, at 135.
97. JEFFERSON, AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 16, at 9. Jefferson rebuked Henry for not circulating the pamphlet either because he disapproved of its views or was too "lazy" to read it.
Nonetheless, the Summary View was circulated and discussed at the August 1774 Convention.
98. 1 PTJ, supra note 27 at 671-76. Edmund Pendleton later recalled that when
Jefferson's views were discussed, there was "applause bestowed on most of them" except
for those on free trade. Id. at 671-72.
99. PETERSON, supranote 11, at 69.
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The Summary View set forth the colonists' "complaints" and the
"redress" sought from the King for their "injured rights."100 The "complaints" were many and manifold. Past kings had divided colonies and
granted lands to proprietors, mistakes which his "majesty's prudence and
understanding would prevent him from initiating at this day." Parliament
had abridged the colonies' "natural right" to "free trade with all parts of
the world."101 It had also "intermeddled" in the colonies' "internal
affairs" and sold lucrative posts to his majesty's "favorites." Yet these
past violations which occurred "at more distant intervals" were far "less
alarming" than "injuries" inflicted since 1763:
Single acts of tyranny may be ascribed to the accidental opinion of the day; but a
series of oppressions, begun at a distinguished period, and pursued unalterably
thro' every change of ministers, too [sic] plainly prove a deliberate, systematical
02

plan of reducing us to slavery.1

With this preface, Jefferson enumerated the manifold elements of this
"systematical plan" in no discernable systematic order. They included, of
course, the "parliamentary usurpations" of the Sugar Act, the Stamp Act,
the Townshend Duties, and the Declaratory Act.10 3 When faced with justifiable colonial resistance, Britain responded by stationing troops which
"made the civil subordinate to the military." 104 Other examples of retaliation included the dissolution of colonial legislatures and the Coercive
Acts directed at Massachusetts. 105
Of special interest, Jefferson condemned the denial of trial by jury in
resounding terms. He warmed to the task by vigorously criticizing the
punishment of the entire "ill-fated" colony of Massachusetts for the transgressions of an "exasperated" few "who threw the tea into the ocean and
dispersed without doing any other act of violence." The Tea Party provided no warrant for punishing all of Boston based on the "partial representations of a few worthless ministerial dependants,...

without calling for a

party accused, without asking a proof, without attempting a distinction
between the guilty and the innocent[.]" 06
In more direct terms, the 1774 act "for the suppression of riots and
tumults" allowed the royal governor to transport those accused of crimes
such as murder to Britain for trial in the court of the King's bench "by a
jury of Middlesex." Witnesses would be subjected to monetary recognizances that required them to appear in Britain for the trial. And should
they make the difficult voyage, "who are to feed the wife and children
whom he leaves behind"? Yet trials in Britain ultimately devastated the
100. Draft Instructions to the Virginia Delegates in the Continental Congress (1774),
reprintedin I PTJ, supra note 27, at 121-35.

101. Id. at 123.
102. Id.at 125.

103.
104.
105.
106.

Id. at
Id.at
Id.at
Id.at

126.
134.
126 (suspension of the New York legislature), 127-28 (Massachusetts).
127.
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accused most of all:
And the wretched criminal, if he happen to have offended on the American side,
stripped of his privilege of trial by peers, of his vicinage, removed from the place
where alone full evidence could be obtained, without money, without counsel,
without friends, without exculpatory proof, is tried before judges predetermined
7
to condemn.10

Of telling importance was the emphasis not just on trial by jury, but the
vicinage itself. This passage points to the emptiness of a jury trial, at least
as understood in the eighteenth century, where the jurors themselves are
unfamiliar with events or the parties' character, and the accused had no
hope of offering witnesses (character or other). In short, a meaningful trial
by jury was something local in nature, something intimate, something that
could not be replicated by the procedural mockery of the 1774 act. And in
the event that readers might shrug off the danger as endemic to Bostonians,
Jefferson referenced a 1772 admiralty act to the same effect which had
been unsuccessfully protested by "the several colonies."1 08 Indeed, the
burning of the British naval vessel Gaspee by Rhode Islanders in 1773
triggered threats to try the criminals (who were never identified) in
England.109 With a dramatic flourish, Jefferson argued that the evisceration of trial by jury might itself justify a violent response, for "[tlhe cowards who would suffer a countryman to be torn from the bowels of their
society in order to be thus offered a sacrifice to parliamentary tyranny
would merit the everlasting infamy now fixed on the authors of the act!"1l10
Although not formally adopted by the Virginia Convention, the
Summary View was later printed in Philadelphia and discussed by the First
Continental Congress. IlI Jefferson's primary purpose was to lay the
"groundwork" for independence while stopping short of an explicit
proclamation.1 12 The First Continental Congress, however, took a measured response that fell well short of Jefferson's hopes. After barring the
importation and exportation of trade goods with Britain, the First
Continental Congress appealed to the "inhabitants" of Quebec for support
against British oppression, taking care to spell out the benefits of trial by
jury for the many French-speaking residents:
[The right of trial by jury] provides that neither life, liberty nor property, can be
taken from the possessor, until twelve of his unexceptionable countrymen and
peers of his vicinage, who from that neighbourhood may reasonably be supposed
to be acquainted with his character, and the characters of the witnesses, upon a
107. Id. at 128-29.
108. Id. at 129. The 1772 act is cited as 12. G. 3. c. 24.
109. PETERSON, supra note 11 at 69. Britain's anger at the burning of the Gaspee was well
known, but the incident is not specifically referenced in the Summary View, perhaps because
the Rhode Islanders had gone "over-the-top" and weakened rather than strengthened
Jefferson's argument.
110. 1 PTJ, supra note 27, at 129.
111. Id. at 672-673. Boyd concludes that Patrick Henry took copies with him
to Philadelphia "and doubtless other members of the Virginia delegation did so likewise." Id.
at 673.
112. PETERSON, supra note 11, at 76-77 (the word "groundwork" is Peterson's).
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fair trial, and full enquiry, face to face, in open Court, before as many of the people as chuse to attend, shall pass their sentence upon oath against him; a sentence
that cannot injure him, without injuring their own reputation, and probably their
interest also; as the question may turn on points, that, in some degree, concern the
general welfare; and if it does not, their verdict may form a precedent, that, on a
similar trial of their own, may militate against themselves.1 13

Thus, the first Congress, like Jefferson, drew from the well-spring of
common-law rights and emphasized the jury's charge to determine the
114
"general welfare."
In no sense was the denial of the right to a trial by jury of the vicinage the linchpin of Jefferson's Summary View, the heart of which concerned the "political relation between us and England."l 15 It was one

grievance among many. Yet he argued the jury right with some passion
and conviction, and at a time when he was still, just barely, a practicing
lawyer. And while he lacked the "folksy" skills of the best trial lawyers,
Jefferson undeniably appreciated that such gifts were completely useless
if trials were held before London-area juries at the King's bench. Trials
before colonial juries effectively blunted Britain's ability to use colonial
courts to squelch colonial resistance. And recourse to trials in London or
the use of jury-less British admiralty courts provided compelling rhetoric
for radicals intent on building the case for independence.
REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT
In late 1776 the Virginia Assembly appointed Jefferson to a committee charged with reforming the commonwealth's law in light of
Revolutionary principles. The reformers produced some of the most celebrated acts of American legal history along side of other significant legislation that has failed to garner the recognition it deserves. Among the
underappreciated were the provisions that dramatically expanded the traditional role of juries. Yet in order to fully appreciate these innovations in
juries, context is critical.
Radicals leaders, including Jefferson, keenly appreciated the importance vel non of building popular support for resistance and independence. The Summary View vividly captured the jury's importance to resistance leaders in 1774 and its continuing role in the imperial crisis. In
Virginia the centrality of the county courts to social and political life
guaranteed that they would play a key role in the process. As courts
became more politicized, law served as a fuel that stoked the furnace of
Revolution. And the venerable jury provided both an avenue for popular
113. Continental Congress to the Inhabitants of the Province of Quebec, quoted in
CONTEXTS OF THE CONSTITUTION 694 (Neil H. Cogan ed., New York, Foundation Press
1999).
114. There is no evidence suggesting that the Summary View in any way motivated or
even inspired Congress's language. The ideas were common currency that Jefferson and the
Congress used to their advantage.
115. JEFFERSON, AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 16, at 9.
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participation and a vent for politicized legal issues. 116 When Jefferson's
law reform commission began work in late 1776, it necessarily drew from
events and ideas integral to the imperial crisis.
Engaging the People: The Jury's Role
In galvanizing support for resistance, "trial by jury" played dual
roles which contributed to the politicization of law and courts. First, as
formal expressions of public will, jury verdicts could embody support for
resistance and, eventually, for revolution. Second, as an abstraction, the
right to trial by jury resonated deeply in popular thought while serving as
a potent symbol of liberty. Jefferson well understood both roles.
No better example of a jury's value in defying imperial power could
be found than the Parson's Cause of 1763. Indelicately ignoring law and
fact, the Hanover County jury awarded the Reverend Maury a single
penny, a paltry finding that seemingly mocked Britain's disallowance of
the Two-Penny Act while affirming the justness of the act itself. Despite
the verdict's manifest weakness on the law, the judges dared not overturn
it in the face of popular enthusiasm. In sum, the "general welfare" (to
use Congress's phrase) had been set forth in a solemn public act-the
verdict.] 17
Mock jury trials were more effective means of protest, as they did
not depend on the serendipity of actual litigation, the proceedings could
be publicly staged in an entertaining way, and the outcome was a foregone conclusion. In September 1765, while Jefferson studied law, resistance to the Stamp Act swept across Virginia. Richard Henry Lee used his
slaves as jailers, sheriff, and executioners for show trials of British Prime
Minister George Grenvile and George Mercer, the designated local stamp
collector. To the public's delight, the effigies were hanged and burned.118
The real Mercer no doubt took note as later "mob" action, also fomented
by Virginia's gentry, quickly forced Mercer's resignation. 19 During the
summer of 1774, as Jefferson penned the Summary View, other Virginians
conducted a jury trial of Lord North for "high treason" based on his having traduced the rights of freeman by introducing unconstitutional taxes.
A "court of liberty" arraigned the putative North, who pleaded not guilty.
The "court" then swore in "a special jury of freeman" who patiently listened to defendant's explanation before convicting him. Standing at the
gallows, the ersatz Lord North confessed his transgressions and begged
116. Blinka, Revolutionary Virginia, supra note 41, at ch. 3.
117. See supra note 113 and accompanying text. Radicals also used juries to prove the
colonies' respect for law, fairness, and justice, as shown by John Adam's role in the acquittal of a British officer charged in the Boston Massacre. See HILLER ZOEBEL, THE BOSTON
MASSACRE (Norton 1970).

118. Blinka, Revolutionary Virginia, supra note 41, at 164.
119. MORGAN, supra note 84, at 161, 189. Lee himself had applied for the post of stamp
collector but wisely withdrew when he better comprehended the act's incendiary effect on
the colonies. Id. at 305.
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other British ministers not to repeat his mistakes. Despite his contrition,
North was hanged and his body burned.120
The mock proceedings dramatically highlighted the increasing politicization of Virginia justice. In 1765 some county courts shuttered their
doors rather than conduct proceedings on the hated stamped paper.
Several courts reconvened but only after declaring the Stamp Act "unconstitutional" and announcing that they would proceed using unstamped
paper.121 So too in 1774 the General Court closed its doors when its
lawyers refused to appear following Governor Dunmore's dissolution of
the Assembly and condemnation of the day of fasting and prayer. Local
courts continued to meet but pointedly refused to hear cases brought by
122
British creditors.
Colonial protests drew upon a rich and varied rhetoric that privileged
trial by jury as a core political right, as evidenced by Jefferson's Summary
View and the first Congress's address to the inhabitants of Quebec. And
its roots ran deep.1 23 The Westmoreland Resolves of February 1766, supported by Richard Henry Lee and other leading men of the county,
attacked the Stamp Act because it had traduced two "fundamental rights":
namely, the right to be taxed only by one's elected representatives and the
right to trial by jury. 124 Although radicals drew from diverse but complementary well-springs,125 an appeal to the colonists' "common-law rights"
carried special resonance. A careful student of the Revolution's intellectual origins, historian Forrest McDonald, concludes that among the pantheon of common law rights, "the genuinely crucial right was that of trial
by jury."126 The common-law jury's raw power to determine facts and
law insulated the people from oppression by the king, judges, and even
legislatures. 27
The imperial crisis heightened the perceived value of jury trials by
threatening to undermine or deny the right altogether. In 1767 the British
created vice-admiralty courts in Boston, Philadelphia, and Charleston in
order to enforce the Townshend Duties. Operating without juries, the
120. George M. Curtis, The Virginia Courts During the Revolution 135-36 (1970)
(unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Wisconsin-Madison).
121. Blinka, Revolutionary Virginia, supra note 41, at 164-65.
122. Curtis, supra note 120, at 110- 15.

123. See UBBELOHDE, VICE-ADMIRALTY COURTS, supra note 7.
124. THE COMMIITEES OF SAFETY OF WESTMORELAND AND FINCASTLE 99-100 (Richard
Harwell, ed., Virginia State Library 1956).
125. Modem historians have stressed the role played by republican ideology in the imperial crisis. The master works are BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION (Harvard University Press 1992) (1967) and GORDON WOOD, THE
RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (Knopf 1992). A useful overview of ideology

and Revolutionary America appears in

STANLEY ELKINS AND ERIC MCKITRICK, THE AGE OF

FEDERALISM 3-29 (Oxford University Press 1993).

126. FORREST
1985).
127. Id.

MCDONALD, NovUs ORDO SECLORUM 40

(University Press of Kansas

HeinOnline -- 47 Am. J. Legal Hist. 57 2005

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL HISTORY

Vol. XLVII

admiralty courts eluded the legal blockade posed by hostile colonial
courts.1 28 Virginia's burgesses who opposed the duties worried about
rumors that Parliament proposed to transport resistance leaders to England
for trial under an old treason statute. 129 Jefferson's Summary View, as we
have seen, revived similar fears of treason trials before hostile English
courts in the crisis of 1774.130
Yet despite their veneration of trial by jury, radicals occasionally
acknowledged that the institution had its limitations and flaws. Jefferson
himself echoed the popular belief that for Americans trials in England
before English juries gutted the right:131 juries of the vicinage meant
jurors familiar with one's character, local customs, and events. And even
local juries did not always guarantee "justice." In 1766 John Chiswell, a
notable member of Virginia's gentry, murdered an inn keeper who had
insulted the drunken Chiswell. Despite the findings of a local examining
court, the General Court in Williamsburg released Chiswell on bail
despite practice and precedent to the contrary. Critics blasted the action as
evidencing that "family and fortune" apparently "entitles a man to superiority."1 32 More devastating were the perceived parallels between the
reviled Stamp Act and the local partiality shown Chiswell. Indeed, some
found the latter more threatening because "this must affect our lives,
while that [the Stamp Act] could only affect our estates."1 33 Most ominously, rumors swirled that Chiswell's powerful cronies planned to stack
the jury with a "menial or pliable tribe of bystanders."1 34 Champions of
the Parson's Cause verdict knew very well that a jury's composition
might well foretell the outcome of a case, and that its composition could
be manipulated by those in power.135 To be sure the Chiswell case was
aberrant and drowned out by the far louder and larger chorus that praised
the jury trial, but those who knew it best understood its limits even if they
did not always choose to articulate them.
"Face of Law": Committees, Juries, and "Enemies to America"
In addition to Revolutionary ideology and the jury's radical role
(mock and actual) in the imperial crisis, the Virginia Experiment drew
upon lessons taught by the shadow government of conventions and
128. MERRILL JENSEN, THE FOUNDING OF A NATION: A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN

REVOLUTION, 1763-1776 273-280 (Oxford 1968).
129. WARREN M. BILLINGS, ET AL., COLONIAL VIRGINIA: A HISTORY 317 (KTO Press

1986).
130. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
131. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
132. Virginia Gazette (Purdie & Dixon), 6 Nov. 1766.
133. Virginia Gazette (Purdie & Dixon), 18 July 1766.
134. Id.
135. Chiswell died before trial, probably as a suicide. For a discussion of the Chiswell
case, see Blinka, Revolutionary Virginia, supra note 41, at 165-67.
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committees that effectively governed Virginia from late 1774 until statehood in 1776. The committees and conventions helped fill the lacunae of
authority caused by the virtual collapse of colonial government in
Virginia while also building popular support for resistance and eventually
independence. In December 1775 the Virginia convention literally revolutionized the use of juries in order to combat the "enemies to America."
Indeed, George Mason had stressed the growing need for local committees to wear "the Face of Law."136 Deeply involved in the Revolutionary
movement, Jefferson closely tracked these developments.
The First Congress formally called for the creation of local committees of safety to enforce its economic sanctions against Britain. The
Continental Association declared that British imports would effectively
cease as of December 1, 1774.137 Exports to Britain would stop on
September 10, 1775, a delay of a year that permitted colonists to sell their
crops while clutching a slender hope for reconciliation. Congress enjoined
"every county, city and town" to form committees of observation elected
by those eligible to vote for local representatives. The committees' role
was to expose publicly those "enemies of American Liberty" who violated the Association.138
Committees quickly formed across Virginia. By December 1775,
most of its counties and three towns had formed committees in the areas
essential to the Association's effectiveness. 139 Although varying in size,
composition, and method of selecting members, the committees shared
two salient features: they embodied popular participation and yet consisted primarily of locally influential men of standing who were active in the
resistance.1 40 The beleaguered and splenetic Virginia governor, Lord
Dunmore, offered a clearly jaundiced yet accurate portrayal of the committees' activities:
There is not a Justice of the Peace in Virginia that acts, except as a Committeeman. The abolishing of the Courts of Justice was the first step taken, in which the
14
men of fortune and pre-eminence joined equally with the lowest and meanest. 1
136. Quoted in JOHN E. SELBY, THE REVOLUTION IN VIRGINIA 78 (Colonial Williamsburg

Foundation 1988).
137. 1 Journals of the Continental Congress 75-80 (Washington, G.P.O. 1904) (the
"Association"). The Continental Association drew upon the very similar Virginia
Association that was announced in August 1774. I PTJ, supra note 27, at 137-41.
138. Journals of the Continental Congress, supra note 137, at 79. Quotes from the
Continental Association were taken from Larry Bowman, The Virginia County Committees
of Safety, 1774-1776, 79 VIRG. MAG. OF HIST. AND BioG. 322 (1971).
139. See Bowman, supra note 138, at 322-23. See also DAVID AMMERMAN, IN THE

COMMON CAUSE 106 (University Press of Virginia 1974) (finding that 51 of 61 Virginia
counties-83 percent -and 3 towns formed committees).
140. Westmoreland County's committee consisted of 35 members, including 16 who had
signed the county's association against the Stamp Act in 1766. Many were influential within
the county. On the western frontier, Fincastle County's committee consisted of only 15 men,
but many were its leading citizens. THE COMMIrEES OF SAFETY OF WESTMORELAND AND
FINCASTLE, supra note 124, at 16-17.

141. Quoted in id. at 19. Ammerman concurs that the committees "affected almost every
conceivable aspect of colonial life." AMMERMAN, supra note 139, at Il1.
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In general, the committees performed four primary functions which
suffused judicial and administrative roles with radical politics. First, they
detected violators of the Association's export and import provisions and
exposed them to censure.1 42 Second, they regulated the prices merchants
could charge for goods in order to prevent price gauging and the
14 3
inevitable popular backlash that might sap the resistance movement.
Third, and most ominously, the committees worked to raise men, money,
and materiel for war.144 Fourth, they helped build and maintain support
for resistance by publicly exposing and castigating non-conformists who
criticized the committees and the cause of liberty.1 45 Non-conformists
included those who flouted regulations on consumption intended to pro46
mote healthy republican habits of "frugality and simpl[e] living."1
Jefferson's interest in the committees' work transcended his role as a
resistance leader. In December 1774 he wrote members of the Virginia
committee of correspondence for guidance about the disposition of a window sash he had ordered from Britain before the Association had been
enacted but which might arrive in violation of its non-importation provisions. Jefferson promised he would heed the dictates of the committee and
147
the association.
Committees took on the appearance of courts when they summoned
suspected offenders, conducted hearings, examined witnesses, issued
findings, and admonished those found guilty. Their primary goals, however, were not to adjudicate disputes, punish offenders, or seek retribution,
rather, the committees sought legitimacy and popular support for resistance. Recalcitrant offenders were publicly exposed and stigmatized.
Those who repented and sought the committees' forgiveness represented a
public victory for the cause of resistance.148 Despite, their judicial trappings, the committees heard cases without a specially denominated "jury."
At first blush this seems incongruous or even hypocritical, but the committees did not hold themselves out as "courts of law" and their composition provided an avenue of popular participation. Colonial county courts
usually consisted of a panel of three to five judges appointed by the governor. The committees were substantially larger, usually number about 21
members who were elected by the county's "patriotic" freeholders. In
short, compared to colonial courts the committees were strikingly more
142. Bowman, supra note 138, at 325-28.
143. Id. at 330-31.
144. Id. at 334.
145. Id. at 328.
146. AMMERMAN, supra note 139, at 116.
147. I PTJ, supra note 27, at 154.

148. See THE COMMrTEES OF SAFETY OF WESTMORELAND AND FINCASTLE, supra note
124, at 32-34, recounting the contrition of David Wardrobe, who either saw the light of the
Revolutionary cause or succumbed to threatened action against his position as a school
teacher. Not all were so easily intimidated. See e.g., id. at 52-53. Henry Glass "damned" the
committee "and declared he did not regard them and would sell his goods as he pleased and
in their teeth."

HeinOnline -- 47 Am. J. Legal Hist. 60 2005

2005

THE JURY IN JEFFERSONIAN AMERICA

democratic in composition and method of selection. 149
While committees built support at the county level across Virginia,
the conventions worked to solidify the resistance movement and preserve
order on a centralized, colony-wide basis. The first convention which convened in August 1774 had met briefly to elect Virginia's delegates to the
First Continental Congress and formulate an "association" for economic
retaliation against Britain. The conventions of 1775 and 1776 struggled to
meet the exigencies of escalating resistance and violence while maintaining internal order amidst the collapse of colonial government.
The March 1775 convention met primarily to address the need for
military defense. Jefferson sat on a committee that reinvigorated the militia law of 1738 and called for troops, ammunition, and other martial supplies. 150 The convention also implored county courts to curtail their dockets, especially in debt cases, in order to minimize economic hardship.]51
Despite this gesture toward a more centralized policy, the
Revolutionary movement remained mostly local and somewhat fragmented. The so-called "Gunpowder Plot" of April 1775 occurred when
Governor Dunmore seized the gunpowder stored in the Williamsburg
magazine during a surprise raid. City officials, backed by a local "independent company" of troops, later confronted Dunmore, who lied that he
had removed the powder to safeguard it from "Negroes." As word spread
across Virginia, other independent companies gathered and marched on
Williamsburg. Peyton Randolph, the speaker of the House of Burgesses
and delegate to the Second Continental Congress, hurriedly convened a
misnamed "Council of War" at Fredericksburg on May 1 to defuse sentiment toward armed violence. The ad hoc council condemned Dunmore's
actions and ordered the companies to return to their homes. All obeyed,
except Patrick Henry's Hanover company, which had deliberately avoided
the Fredericksburg council and sought justice on its own terms. An influential planter, Carter Braxton, finally persuaded Henry to hold off while a
peaceful resolution was sought. Dunmore ultimately agreed to pay 230
pounds for the stolen powder, a settlement largely extorted by Henry's
threat of force. Most important, the Gunpowder Plot revealed the need for
more centralized supervision of the resistance effort, especially the local
committees and independent companies.
Events soon induced the necessary political will to action. Although
the Gunpowder Plot paled in comparison to the bloody fighting near
Boston, where hundreds perished at Lexington, Concord, and Bunker Hill,
Virginia too teetered on the brink. Wild rumors circulated that Dunmore
had dug an underground fuse to the Williamsburg magazine so that he
could destroy the city if necessary. Dunmore further exacerbated local
fears by forbidding extra-legal conventions and later fleeing with his fain149. Blinka, Revolutionary Virginia, supra note 41, at 187-88.
150. 1 PTJ, supra note 27, at 160.
151. William E. White, The Independent Companies of Virginia, 1774-1775, 86 VIRG.
MAG. OF HIST. AND BIOG. 49 (1978).
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ily to a nearby British warship. Resistance leaders seized upon Dunmore's
flight as an abdication of power and an opportunity to fill the resulting
vacuum.

15 2

When the July convention opened, concrete steps were taken toward
enhancing centralized control and reducing the risk of local fragmentation. 153 Jefferson's duties in Congress precluded him from attending the
Virginia convention, but he corresponded with its leaders and undoubted-

54
ly followed its actions closely.1
First, the convention abolished the "independent" companies and
consolidated Virginia's military resources into three regiments based on
military districts that grouped counties along geographic lines. Each district was charged with raising and supporting a company of men.
Democracy was curbed along with localism. No longer would companies
elect officers; rather, a select group from each district, drawn from among
the constituent counties' committees of safety, would appoint them. 155
Second, the July convention regularized the form and structure of the
county committees because of the "many inconveniencies" caused by
overly-large bodies and members who sometime served without limit,
"which is incompatible with the principle of representation.", 56 Henceforth, county committees were to consist of "twenty-one of the most
discreet, fit, and able men" of the county elected annually by those eligible to elect burgesses. Elections were to occur in November 1775.157
Third, county committees were enjoined to obey the directives of the
Continental Congress and the Virginia convention:

And to the end this ordinance may be duly carried into execution, and the duties
required of certain persons therein named faithfully discharged, It is hereby further declared and ordained, That if any sheriff, mayor, chairman, or clerk of a
152. Id. at 157-58. See also BILLINGS, supra note 129, at 342-43.
153. See The Statutes at Large: Being a Collection of All the Laws of Virginia, From the
First Session of the Legislature in the Year 1619, 9: 9-74 (William W. Hening, ed.,
University Press of Virginia 1969, facsimile reprint) (ordinances of the July convention).
Not to be overlooked, the convention "legalized" its own existence. The two earlier conventions-August 1774 and March 1775-had been "expedient" in light of Virginia's "critical
and dangerous state." Id. at 56. Now it was "indispensably necessary for the oppressed people of this country"-at least its freeholders-to elect annually two delegates from each
county to represent them at a convention that following May. Id. at 54-55.
154. Letter by Jefferson to the President of the Virginia Convention (II July 1775), in
I PTJ, supra note 27, at 223. The letter apprised the July Convention of Congress's actions
and implored it to prepare for "the worst events." He also urged the Convention to send a
"few gentlemen of genius and spirit to the military school before Boston to learn that necessary art." No formal military school was established, but the instruction of cadets under
George Washington's tutelage had been discussed by Congress. See id. at 224.
155. The Statutes at Large, supra note 153, 9: 35. See also White, supra note 151, at 16061. White found that military discipline among the independent companies was unacceptably low. Companies voted not only for their officers, but also voted whether to obey orders.
Desertion and insubordination became rampant.
156. The Statutes at Large, supra note 153, at 9: 57-59.
157. Id. at 9: 58. Each committee was to select its own chairman and clerk, and could
authorize a committee of correspondence or other subcommittees as deemed necessary.
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committee, or any other person named herein who is required to do any particular
act, or perform any certain duty, shall perversely, obstinately, or willfully refuse
or neglect to comply with the directions of this ordinance, such person so offending, and being adjudged guilty thereof by the committee of the county or corporation where such delinquency may happen, shall be deemed an enemy to
American liberty and the welfare of this country, and be subject to the censures
of the continental association, in such cases provided.158

The nascent "supremacy clause" was obviously intended to avoid the embarrassment and danger of reprisal posed by Henry's maverick actions that
April. Congress and the convention would demarcate the "line of duty."
Finally, the convention created a colony-wide "Committee of
Safety." Composed of eleven members and led by Edmund Pendleton, the
Committee of Safety included some of Virginia's most powerful resistance leaders.1 59 Like the dictators of republican Rome who governed in
times of emergency, its members served a term of just one year unless the
convention decreed otherwise. The Committee of Safety, a civilian
authority, commanded Virginia's military, whose officers were "required
to pay strict obedience" to its orders. The colony-wide committee also
corresponded with the county committees in order to obtain "authentick
intelligence" and to ensure its orders were carried out. 160
As Virginians consolidated the resistance movement, tension with
Britain increased precipitously, culminating in bloody fighting in the
southern Chesapeake. After fleeing the capital. Dunmore led British
troops on a series of raids and later established a base of operations in
Norfolk. In November 1775 he stunned Virginians by offering freedom
for slaves who deserted their masters and joined his "Ethiopian
Regiment." 16 1 On December 9, 1775 Dunmore's troops, including the
Ethiopian Regiment, fought Virginia's 2d Regiment at Great Bridge, near
Norfolk. After a brief but bloody fight, the Virginians forced the British to
withdraw and eventually abandon Norfolk as well.162 Inexplicably, they
later plundered and burned the town.16 3
Thus when the December Convention convened, it presided over a
people torn by war, by economic distress, and by severely divided loyalties. Dunmore retained fierce loyalist support in the southern Chesapeake.
The resistance movement, while gaining increasing strength, did not yet
command enough support for independence. 164 The burning of Norfolk,
158. Id. at 9: 60. The same ordinance also provided that the committees shall "confine
themselves within the line of duty prescribed by the continental congress and the general
convention, and shall not assume to themselves in any other power or authority whatever."
Id. at 59.
159. Id. at 9: 49.
160. Id. at 9: 49-53. The Committee of Safety directed troop movements, deployments,
and encampments. It also had full authority to contract for services and supplies.
161. SELBY, supra note 136, at 60-68.
162. Id. at 69-74.
163. BILLINGS, supra note 129, at 344.
164. SELBY, supra note 136, at 79.
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even more than Henry's free-lancing in the spring, hammered home the
need to maintain order, assume the appearance of lawful government, and
permit some measure of popular participation.
The December Convention's lasting contribution to the
Revolutionary cause was its fascinating "ordinance for establishing a
mode of punishment for the enemies to America in this colony" (hereinafter, the "Enemies to America Act").1 65 Seven months before the
Declaration of Independence, Virginia's patriots portrayed themselves as
"Americans" and branded their opponents "enemies." "Dangerous
attempts" had been made to subvert Virginians' rights and liberties, the
act's preamble observed, and despite a "human disposition" to accommodate the opposition, more stringent measures were necessary. The
Enemies to America Act granted a sixty-day safe harbor during which
"white persons" who had armed themselves against the colony could surrender and, apparently, redeem their good standing. After the sixty days
had lapsed, harsh penalties awaited those who "assisted" the "enemy" by
enlisting as a soldier, by giving intelligence, by furnishing arms, provisions, or naval stores, or by bearing arms against the colony.1 66 Offenders
could be imprisoned for an unspecified term and their estates, real and
personal, subjected to confiscation and liquidation in payment of his "just
debts." In all cases, the Committee of Safety had the discretion to grant
pardons when satisfied that the offender was appropriately repentant, but
the convention retained the ultimate say over whether the offender's
estates were to be restored.
To give added teeth to the Continental Association, the Enemies to
America Act strengthened enforcement by authorizing the confiscation of
illegally imported or exported goods, wares, and merchandise. Even a written order for illegal imports violated the Association. Besides confiscation,
illegal importers could be barred from any further trade in Virginia.
The act's sweeping terms granted broad discretion to officials
responsible for its enforcement. Defining Virginia's "enemies" and determining their proper punishment had been left deliberately vague. The act
also established a judicial structure that tacitly drained authority from the
county courts and, in some ways, from the local committees of safety in
favor of the centralized Committee of Safety.
First, the act established an admiralty court with jurisdiction over all
offenses involving vessels and their cargo. Obviously, the linchpin of the
Association's embargo concerned shipments of exports and imports. By
stripping local committees of jurisdiction over "vessels and their cargoes"
and placing it in a single court, the Convention hoped to attain more consistent, effective enforcement of the Association as well as dispose of
"prize" cases. The Convention appointed Edmund Randolph, John Blair,
165. The Statutes at Large, supra note 153, at 9:101-107. The act's title, which juxtaposes "enemies to America" with the reference to "colony," nicely reveals the Convention's
divided mind.
166. Id. at 9:102.
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and James Holt to serve as the three admiralty judges, based on their firm
commitment to the resistance effort and, presumably, their willingness to
work in harmony with the Committee of Safety.' 67
For violations not involving "vessels and cargoes," the act authorized special commissions composed of 5 men drawn from each county
committee. The commissions were to sit as a "court" at the local courthouse where they had "full power and authority" to implement the act
with the sheriff's assistance.1 68 The commissions literally split the difference between the old courts and the local committees. The largely defunct
colonial courts had ceased to function except for criminal cases and
although many justices of the peace were devoted to the resistance movcment, not all could be trusted. 169 Yet the local committee themselves,
despite the July reforms, were still unwieldy and not always obedient. 170
By giving Virginia's Committee of Safety the ability to select 5 commissioners from among the 21 local committee members, the act provided
latitude to select those who were diligent, reliable, and less likely to stray
from centralized direction. Defendants also had the right to appeal judgments to the Committee of Safety.
Finally, the Enemies to America Act truly revolutionized the English
common law. It provided that "in all trials pursuant to this ordinance, the
commissioners aforesaid shall cause a jury to be summoned, and proceed
in the same manner as hath been heretofore observed for the trial of civil
causes in this colony."171 Put another way, both the admiralty court and
the special commission courts now had to incorporate juries of freeholders into their decision-making. Guaranteeing the right to trial by jury in
admiralty cases-an innovation undoubtedly motivated, if not necessitated, by the patriots' harsh and incessant criticism of British vice-admiralty
courts that sat without juries-broke sharply with age-old precedent.172
More intriguingly, the act characterized the trials as "civil," not "criminal" causes. The Convention's intent is manifestly unclear. The phrase
could reflect the jury's authority to determine the offender's "just debt,"
his ownership of property, and the fairness of confiscation and liquida167. Blair and Randolph were lawyers and Holt was a Williamsburg merchant. In earlier
fighting, patriot forces had captured nearly a dozen ships. The convention adjudicated the
disposition of those "prizes" but established the admiralty court in anticipation of more such
cases. SELBY, supra note 136, at 76.
168. The Statutes at Large, supra note 153, at 9: 105.

169. See SELBY, supra note 136, at 76, who observes that many of the county committees
were the "old county courts under a different name."
170. See Id. at 78. As late as December, a number of local committees had not conducted
elections as required by the July Convention.
171. The Statutes at Large, supra note 153, at 9: 106.

172. Id. Perhaps the change was so jolting that some later questioned whether the
December Convention actually authorized jury trials in admiralty courts. The following
spring the May Convention confirmed what seemed obvious from the act's original language: contrary to ancient precedent, the right to trial by jury extended to admiralty courts.
Id. at 130-31.
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tion, all issues familiar to civil litigation. Or it might signal a somewhat
greater tolerance for commissioners, or the Committee of Safety itself,
stepping in and policing the juries' verdicts, especially when they favored
the defendant. An acquittal in a criminal case largely precluded any tampering by the judge. A defense verdict in a civil case, however, could
more easily be set aside and trial ordered before a new, perhaps more
amenable panel. 73
In sum, the Enemies to America Act blended courts, conventions,
and committees, local and central. The act promised to transform the local
committees of safety into something more closely resembling regular
courts of law, at least when they performed adjudicative tasks under the
Association. Guaranteeing the right to trial by jury not only accommodated revolutionary rhetoric, it also purchased legitimacy by inviting popular
participation in official decision-making through a classic common-law
institution. As George Mason had urged, the "face of law" had to be
placed quickly on the shadowy authority of committees and convention.
Jefferson, who understood law through history, undoubtedly absorbed,
sympathized, and ultimately drew from these lessons.
REVOLUTIONARY LAW REFORM AND THE "SPIRIT OF '76":
JURIES AND THE PEOPLE
With the advent of independence, Virginia found itself within a
"constitutional moment" as it consciously resculpted the structure of its
government and laws. 174 In its Declaration of Rights, which privileged the
jury in two different sections, and through the work of its law reform
commission, led by Jefferson, Virginia evinced optimism and even enthusiasm about the jury as a vehicle for popular participation. Yet one also
finds palpable wariness about the suitability of juries and, more fundamentally, the capacity of the people, for their new roles. In short, the
Virginia experiment's designers were not idealists swept away by rhetoric
or blinded by abstractions, rather, they approached their work with a keen
awareness of the people's limits. In particular, Jefferson deeply appreciated that trial by jury opened the door to emotional, sometimes capricious
decision-making.
"The Whole Object": Independence and Republican Government
In May 1776 the Second Continental Congress anticipated that the
united North American colonies stood at the very brink of declaring independence. The battles in Massachusetts and Virginia portended the fierce
fight at Moore's Creek Bridge, North Carolina, in the spring of 1776.
Meanwhile, New Hampshire had already replaced its colonial charter with
173. See I JAMES OLDHAM, THE MANSFIELD MANUSCRIPTS 150 (University of North
Carolina Press 1992).
174. BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE 6-7 (Harvard University Press 199 1).
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an interim written constitution in January and South Carolina followed
suit in March. On May 10, 1776 Congress recommended that all colonies
"adopt such government as shall in the opinion of the people, best conduce to the happiness and safety of their constituents in particular and
America in general."1 75
Virginia's May Convention was prepared. It quickly resolved that
Congress should formally and unequivocally declare independence. The
Convention also appointed a drafting committee to prepare a state bill of
rights and constitution. 176 Led by the talented George Mason, the
Convention approved the Declaration of Rights on June 12, 1776 and a
constitution just three weeks later on June 29.177
Virginia's constitution blended familiar colonial forms with
Revolutionary innovations, yet overall it was a strikingly conservative
document. The state's three "departments" strongly resembled their colonial antecedents. For example, the eight-man Privy Council, which counseled the governor, drew on the now-defunct colonial governor's council
(which had also inspired the state-wide Committee of Safety). The imperial crisis had, however, surely influenced governmental forms. The
strongest department was clearly the legislature, which annually elected a
governor who could not serve more than three consecutive terms. 178 For
Virginians, however, their primary contact with government came at the
local level in the courthouse. And the 1776 constitution envisioned no
radical overhaul of county government; rather, it looked to a reworking of
the county courts by the new General Assembly, which itself had the
power to appoint local justices of the peace. Put differently, the local
committees of safety, elected by the county's freeholders and now playing
the role of local courts, were not embraced by the constitution. Only the
79
jury, as we shall see, offered the people a voice in local affairs.
Befitting the rhetoric devoted to trial by jury during the imperial crisis, it was hardly surprising that two provisions of the Declaration of
Rights addressed the jury. One section governed criminal trials:
That in all capital or criminal prosecutions, a man hath a right to demand the
cause and nature of his accusation, to be confronted with the accusers and witnesses, to call for evidence in his favour, and to a speedy trial by an impartial
jury of his vicinage; without whose unanimous consent, he can not be found
guilty; nor can he be compelled to give evidence against himself. And that no
man be deprived of his liberty except by the law of the land, or the judgment of
his peers18O

175. 4 Journal of the Continental Congress, supra note 137, at 342.
176. SELBY, supra note 136, at 94- 101.
177. See SELBY, id. at ch 6.
178. Blinka, Revolutionary Virginia, supra note -, at 212-214. It is not my purpose to
review exhaustively the prime features of the 1776 constitution and how it departed from, or
reflected, the colonial antecedents.
179. Id. at 217-218.
180. 1 ROBERT RUTLAND, THE PAPERS OF GEORGE MASON 288 (University of North

Carolina Press 1970).
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Another, shorter section addressed civil cases:
That in controversies respecting property, and in suits between man and man, the
ancient trial by jury is preferable to any other, and ought to be held sacred. 18I

Mason offered the original drafts of both provisions, which were later
modified by the drafting committee. The committee adopted the bulk of
the criminal provision but added the adjective "impartial" before "jury of
the vicinage," a vivid reminder that not just any twelve jurors will do.
More significant, it substituted the last sentence in place of one that would
have permitted arbitrary arrests, unsupported by evidence, in times of
"actual invasions or insurrection." Mason's proposal for jury trials in civil
cases was adopted nearly verbatim, but the committee's deletion of a single word foreshadowed future developments: Mason proposed to provide
trial by jury in "all controversies" involving property and suits "between
man and man." A bit more wary of such far reaching changes, the committee struck the word "all."1 82
Together, the two jury provisions had a four-fold significance. First,
trial by jury was not a single undifferentiated right, rather, it served multiple functions which would have to be worked out in the future. Second,
these differences begot other distinctions. Not only must the criminal jury
be "impartial," it must be drawn from the "vicinage" (the locale where the
crime occurred) and unanimous in its verdict. The civil provision omits
any reference to vicinage, unanimity, or, for that matter, impartiality.
Third, the different wording strongly suggested an increasing but still
inchoate awareness that civil and criminal trials were somehow
fundamentally different, and perhaps the roles played by juries should be
different.18 3 In the criminal provision the jury right is nestled among other
procedural rights designed to safeguard individual freedom, such as the
accused's right to notice of the charges.1 84 In civil suits between individuals, including those over property rights, there is no readily identifiable
oppressor. The jury's role is to settle "controversies" over property.
Finally, one is struck by the obviously lukewarm, largely hortatory
endorsement of juries in civil disputes. Juries were "preferable to any
other" mode of trial and "ought to be held sacred"-hardly a ringing
affirmation, particularly in light of the committee's redaction of language
181. id.
182. Id. at 277-78.
183. Obviously, colonial law followed British practice and formally distinguished
between civil and criminal trials. See 3 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of
England chs. 22 and 23 (1768; reprint, University of Chicago Press 1979). Yet the homogenized nature of colonial justice blended not only the executive, judicial, and legislative roles
into an unrecognizable hash, it also blurred the lines between civil and criminal cases. The
constitutional moment of 1776 was not, however, an effort to recapture a lost-Blackstonian
purity, but a fresh attempt to draw important distinctions between civil and criminal trials in
the republic.
184. Historians are divided over the merits of Mason's draft. Leonard Levy is highly critical, branding it "careless" and displaying "bad draftsmanship." LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS
OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT

407-08 (Oxford University Press 1968). Levy is persuasively

rebutted by Rutland. I Papersof George Mason, supra note 180, at 281.
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suggesting that parties had a right to jury trial in "all" civil "controversies." In sum, civil and criminal jury trials were assuming different roles.
The former seemed less essential than the latter, and perhaps different in
nature as well.
Jefferson was disappointed by Virginia's constitution.1 85 Obligated
by his Congressional duties to remain in Philadelphia, he pined to participate because a new government was the "whole object" of the
Revolution. 186 From Philadelphia, Jefferson submitted multiple drafts of
more radical proposals-which were politely received by the convention but
largely overlooked. Later that year, however, as a member of the newlyelected General Assembly and the prime-mover on a committee appointed
to revise Virginia's laws, Jefferson would have a concrete opportunity to
implement his evolving ideas, particularly as they relate to juries.
Laws to Govern "Our Present Circumstances":
Law Reform and Juries
Law reform in Virginia embodied a multi-faceted effort to adjust
common-law institutions, such as the jury, in light of Revolutionary
thought, events, and necessity. Many of these ideas permeated the polity,
but it fell to Jefferson and his committee to articulate and specify how the
new state government and its laws would operate. Not surprisingly, their
innovations and radical proposals also harbored many of the ambiguities,
compromises, and misgivings shared by others.
After approving Virginia's Declaration or Rights and constitution,
the May Convention instructed local committees to muster additional men
and officers for what would likely be a protracted, difficult struggle to
achieve militarily what had been declared politically.1 87 The Convention
also responded to the pressing and immediate need to maintain order and
assure justice while the details of the new legal order were worked out.
The ordinance's preamble nicely portrayed a radical mindset tempered by
pragmatic concerns:
WHEREAS it hath been found indispensably necessary to establish government

in this colony, independent of the crown of Great Britain, or any authority
derived therefrom, and a plan of such government hath been accordingly formed
by the general convention but it will require some considerable time to compile a
body of laws suited to the circumstances of the country, and it is necessary to

provide some method of preserving peace and security to the community in the
meantime ....

188

Until directed otherwise, courts were to apply a melange of colonial
statutes, revolutionary ordinances, "the common law of England," and
English statutes in effect prior to 1607.189
185. 1 PTJ, supranote 27, at 330.
186. Id.
187. The Statutes at Large, supra note 153, at 9: 135.

188. Id. at 9:126.
189. Id. at 9:127.
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When the first General Assembly convened in October 1776, it lost
little time in providing some new direction. After revising the tobacco
inspection act and shoring up enforcement of the Association,1 90 the
Assembly moved to broaden and deepen support for the Revolution by
"repealing" Parliamentary acts that had punished religious dissenters
while also freeing them from obligations to pay church levies.l91
Two statutes foretold the radical potential for Virginia law reform.
The first statute, influenced by Jefferson, defined the crime of treason
against the independent state of Virginia.192 The treason act self-consciously attested to the former colony's newly proclaimed sovereignty and
drew upon more than ten years of criticism aimed at Britain's incessant
threats to try American radicals as traitors in London. The Assembly narrowly and carefully defined treason as either waging war against "the
commonwealth" or aiding its enemies. The proof requirements were stringent: treason had to be manifested by overt acts; merely "compassing"
(imagining) treasonous thoughts was insufficient. Moreover, the prosecution had to show either a voluntary confession or testimony by two "lawful witnesses" to the traitor's "open deed."1 93
A far more pressing problem than treason, 194 which after all applied
only to apostates, were the many thousands, especially in southern
Virginia, who remained loyal to Britain and actively opposed the new
government. The Assembly made it unlawful for any person to defend
openly British authority or to incite others to "resist the government of
this commonwealth as by law established." The act also punished those
who maliciously "discouraged" men from enlisting in service to the commonwealth or who even "dispose[d] them to favor the enemy." The penalties were harsh: a fine not to exceed £20,000 or imprisonment for not
more than five years. as determined by a jury.
The act is striking for two reasons. First, it criminalized loyalist
behavior. Loyalists (or laggards) no longer faced the muted wrath of a
local committee whose primary weapon was public shaming.1 95 Second,
and more important, the act reposed in the jury the power to punish. Put
differently, the jury would determine not only guilt, but also the amount
of any fine and the duration of imprisonment, subject to the specified lim190. Id. at 9:153.
191. Id. at 9:164.
192. PETERSON, supra note I , at 132-33.

193. The Statutes at Large, supra note 153, at 9:168. Convicted traitors faced death without benefit of clergy. Their lands and chattels were forfeit to the state, except for the
widow's dower. Yet no "such attainder" resulted in a "corruption of blood" whereby the
family suffered for the traitor's own acts. For the common-law of treason, see LACY B.
SMITH, TREASON IN TUDOR ENGLAND: POLITICS AND PARANOIA 136 (Princeton University
Press 1986).
194. See PETERSON, supra note 11, at 132 (noting that Virginia executed no one for treason during the Revolution and generally manifested "forebearance and moderation").
195. See supra note 148 and accompanying text (discussing the Wardrobe and Glass
cases).
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its. The commonwealth's juries would inevitably be comprised of patriots
who supported independence.1 96 The act thus allowed common men to
participate in politically charged cases through a mechanism with impeccable legal and political legitimacy. Jury sentencing fully comported with
the floodtide of republican rhetoric, the experience of local committees
and the revolutionary precedent that required the use of juries in admiralty
litigation. Allowing "the people" to decide guilt and assess punishment
insulated Virginia courts from criticism that judges or laws were arbitrary
and vindictive. In this way a court's judgment might better reflect the
community's sense of what the accused had done and how it ought to be
dealt with, thereby promoting acceptance of judicial decisions and acquiescence in Revolutionary law.
On November 5, 1776, in just its ninth formal act, the Assembly
appointed a five-person committee to revise Virginia's laws. The act monumentally understated the enormous challenges that loomed: Adopt
Virginia's laws to "our present circumstances." 197 Yet the Assembly well
understood that those "present circumstances" included not just Virginia's
newly declared independence and republican constitution, but war, bitter
social conflict, and economic devastation. For these reasons, as well as
the time it would take to review just the laws, the Assembly set the due
date at June 18, 1779. It appointed a distinguished group of men whose
fidelity to the revolt was unquestioned: Thomas Jefferson, Thomas
Ludwell Lee, George Mason, Edmund Pendleton, and George Wythe.
Mason and Lee played little or no role, leaving the lion's share of the
work to Jefferson, Pendleton, and Wythe.198 All three had been active in
Virginia's movement from resistance to revolution. Their experience and
erudition in law, especially as practiced in Virginia, gave them a firm
sense of what needed to be changed, or left alone, under the "present circumstances."
The committee approached the revision with the two overarching
objectives that, while not exactly inconsistent, created a tension necessitating trade-offs and compromises: somehow liberty and popular government must be reconciled with reason and objectivity. Both goals stemmed
from the eighteenth-century Enlightenment. A republican government of
the people had no need for feudal vestiges such as primogeniture or entail.
Court reforms, particularly the expanded use of juries, permitted people to
become more involved in official decision-making. In short, the committee jettisoned archaic feudal remnants that sharply limited opportunities
for social and economic improvement, and serviced only an increasingly
196. See The Statutes at Large, supra note 153, at 9: 416-17 (trial and grand jurors were
to be "good and lawful men"; those who resisted the Revolution were, of course, "enemies
to America" and hence ineligible).
197. Id. at 9:175.
198. Mason begged off because he was not a lawyer and felt "unqualified" for the task.
Lee excused himself for the same reason and died a short time thereafter. 2 PTJ, supra note
38, at 315.
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outmoded view of a static hierarchical society. Moreover, the people
were-entitled to a voice in their government and laws.
The committee's work also encompassed a second cluster of vital
concerns, namely, the Enlightenment's emphasis on reason, objectivity,
and the rule of law. 199 Jefferson noted that the law revision was undertaken "with a single eye to reason, and the good of those for whose government it was framed." 200 One discerns in this sentence a whiff of arrogance
and elitism, a sense that the public's voice was welcome except where the
committee identified rules so sound and so compelling (thanks to the "single eye of reason") that all should follow them for their own "good."
The committee first met in Fredericksburg on January 13, 1777, to
plan its work. A simple restatement of existing law was never considered
because it conflicted with the committee's charge. At the other pole, the
revisors also rejected the radical extreme of abolishing all existing laws
and preparing a modern version of Justinian's Institutes tailored to "present circumstances." An "Institutes" would have compelled the committee
to reduce all law to a single text, an arduous, largely hopeless task that
also risked ignoring the public's shifting needs. The committee's plan,
according to Jefferson, consisted of five principles that dramatically (and
no doubt deliberately) understated the extent to which their proposals
modified existing law:
[I] The Common Law not to be meddled with, except where Alterations are
necessary.
[2] The Statutes to be revised and digested, alterations proper for us to be made;
the Diction, where obsolete or redundant to be reformed; but otherwise to undergo as few Changes as possible.
[3] The Acts[ of the English Common-wealth to be examined.
[4] The Statutes to be divided into Periods: the Acts of Assembly, made on the

same Subject to be incorporated into them.
[5] The Laws of the other Colonies to be examined, and any good ones to be
20
adopted. O

Years later while in Paris, Jefferson wrote that it would have been "dangerous" to attempt a written explication of all laws, including the common
law. In his Notes on the State of Virginia, Jefferson candidly explained the
method adopted by the committee:
The plan of the revisal was this. The common law of England, by which is meant,
that part of the English law which was anterior to the date of the oldest statutes
extant, is made the basis of the work. It was thought dangerous to attempt to reduce
it to a text: it was therefore left to be collected from the usual monuments of it.
Necessary alternations in that, and so much of the whole body of the British statutes,
and of acts of assembly, as were thought proper to be retained, were digested into
2
126 new acts, in which simplicity of stile was aimed at, as far as was safe. 02
199.
102-03
200.
201.

See CARL BECKER, THE HEAVENLY CITY OF THE EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY
(Yale 1932).
2 PTJ, supra note 38, at 307 (quoting Jefferson).
Id. at 325 (spelling and capitalization as original).

PHILOSOPHERS

202. THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 137 (William Peden ed.,

Norton 1972) (1787).
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Thus, the common law with its helpful but maddening vagaries formed
the superstructure upon which the committee worked.
Despite abundant optimism and the committee's diligence, talent, and
hard work, the revision never quite "came into focus." The committee's
work culminated in a report of June 18, 1779, which historians have accurately described as "drawn out" and an "anticlimax." 203 The sense of disappointment stems from several developments. First, there is the sheer bulk of
proposals. The committee prepared 126 bills covering nearly all facets of
Virginia law. Second, their breadth and diversity made them difficult to
comprehend as a coherent whole. Third, some of the more intricate and most
ambitious bills, such as proposals for public education and reform of capital
punishment, never became law. The few genuinely innovative bills that
passed, such as the abolition of entails and primogeniture and the statute
guaranteeing religious freedom, represented an "occasional landmark"
204
against an otherwise obscure background of "ordinary legislation."
It has also proven enormously difficult to identify "the revision."
More precisely, one must distinguish pre-existing law, the committee's
proposals, and the legislation enacted by the General Assembly.
Responding to urgent political demands, the committee quickly drafted
certain legislation and submitted it for the General Assembly's adoption
long before the report's due date in June 1779.205 In looking at the legislation between 1776 and 1779, it is not always clear whether the ideas
emanated from the committee or from the General Assembly. The
final report of June 18, 1779 incorporated some of this earlier, extant
legislation, but many of its provision were not reviewed until the
mid-1780s. 206 Thus, the revision's enormous size, its amorphous nature,
its overall failure to become law, and its piecemeal consideration over a
ten-year period all combined to make "the revision" remarkably difficult
to assess.
What is clear, however, is that Jefferson "was nominally and actually the leading figure in the revisal" of the commonwealth's laws.207 And
after 1776 Virginia experimented with juries to a degree hitherto
203. 2 PTJ, supra note 38, at 305 (never "came into focus"; "drawn out"; "anti-climax").
204. Id. The significance of the act abolishing entails is still debated among historians.
Although some historians have dramatically downplayed the significance of this legislation,
Holly Brewer persuasively argues that Jefferson's reform did effect radical change. Holly
Brewer, Entailing Aristocracy in Colonial Virginia: Ancient Feudal Restraints and
Revolutionary Reform, 54 WM. & MARY QUARTERLY, 3d ser., 307 (1997).

205. See, for example, Bill No. 7, "A Bill Giving Certain Powers to the Governor and
Council for a Limitted [sic] Time," which was introduced on January 13, 1778 and passed
on January 22. 2 PTJ, supra note 38, at 363-64.
206. Moreover, the Assembly considered some of the bills in 1779 but postponed further
consideration of the entire package until October 1785, a delay of six years. It adopted only
about a third of the bills in 1785 but delayed even their implementation until January 1787,
ostensibly so that the Assembly could closely scrutinize the remainder in October 1786.
When it did consider the rest of the revision, the Assembly rejected the vast bulk of it. Id.
305-09.
207. Id. at 313.
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unknown in Anglo-American law. Innovative legislation authorized juries
to engage in selected matters of public administration, to decide factual
issues in admiralty courts and in equity actions, and to sentence criminals
in addition to adjudging their guilt. The experiment confirmed the extent
to which revolutionary ideology and the democratic experience of government by committee affected the function of courts and juries in the new
republic. In the first flush of revolution these influences resulted in a
greater involvement of the people in formulating and implementing the
law through the ancient institution of the jury.
The sections below canvass each of these experiments. Each development will be assessed in light of prior Anglo-colonial practice, how the
Virginia innovation changed that practice and conformed to revolutionary
imperatives, and the role played by the law revision committee (Jefferson,
Wythe, and Pendleton). Historians have occasionally looked at individual
pieces of this grand experiment, but the innovations have never been adequately explicated or appreciated as a coherent whole that gave voice to the
committee's daunting mission: reconcile reason with popular participation.
The Jury and Public Administration
Revolutionary Virginia relied upon juries to help decide a host of
issues which, for lack of a better term, are best conceptualized as involving "public policy" because they affected the community, not just parties
to a lawsuit. To take the most dramatic example, juries established
salaries for public officials: a verdict with no lawsuit, no parties, and no
trial. Although most provisions were built solidly upon colonial precedent, others reflected the exigencies of war and radical republicanism's
eagerness to find new outlets for the people's voices. The Virginia
Assembly, sometimes assisted by Jefferson and the revisors, found the
jury an expedient adjunct to decision-making in some contexts, but never
came close to surrendering its own autonomy.
The commonwealth jury's public policy role built upon earlier practice. In colonial Virginia, juries helped determine internal-improvements
by deciding appropriate locations for roads and mill dams. 208 Grand juries
regularly indicted negligent road overseers, cheats who tendered "seconds" of tobacco, and others who violated regulatory laws, such as those
concerning ordinaries (taverns and inns). During the imperial crisis, local
committees of safety actively policed the community's adherence to the
boycott. In their size and operation, the committees functioned as a people's court where all members were both judge and jury. When the
Commonwealth of Virginia formally opened the doors of its courthouses
in 1777, it reestablished the demarcation between judges and jurors while
retaining and expanding the jury's role in public administration. 209
208. See Blinka, Revolutionary Virginia, supra note 41, at ch. 2.
209. See The Statutes at Large, supra note 153, at 9: 178 (continuing the power of the
committee of safety) and 9: 218 (October 1776 act extending the commission of the court of
oyer and terminer until the general court was established).
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Early wartime legislation reflected juries' traditional roles in public
matters, dramatically adjusted for the exigencies of Revolution.
Government contractors who diverted funds or neglected their responsibilities handicapped the war effort. Explaining that "no adequate remedy"
existed to cure this "evil," the General Assembly designed a quick and
inexpensive procedure for collecting misappropriated funds: a jury trial on
both breach and damages could occur within as little as ten days from the
date that the contractor received notice of the deficiencies. 2 10 The
Committee of Revisors later embraced the substance of this act in a more
succinct, comprehensive proposal directed at all who misappropriated
"public money" for "public use." Within 15 days of serving written notice
on offenders, courts were to "instantly" impanel juries to decide all
issues. 2 11The Assembly enacted the revised version in 1786.212
Wartime conditions necessitated new economic regulations, mostly
aimed at profiteers, that gave grand juries and trial juries some voice in
alleviating badly depressed markets. In 1777-78 the Assembly passed various acts directed at "forestallers," "regraters," and "engrossers" who
exploited short supplies and inflated prices.2 13 In particular, unscrupulous
entrepreneurs stood to gain enormously from a government forced to pay
high prices to feed, clothe and arm its fighting forces. George Mason
excoriated those "'divers persons devoting themselves to avarice and
extortion, and intending to amass riches out of the ruins of their country,
or treacherously to betray it into the hands of its enemies by forestalling
and engrossing the provisions necessary for the sustenance of its armies in
the ensuing campaigns.' 214 As we will see in the discussion of criminal
210. Id. at 9: 300. In addition to the summary jury trial against derelict public contractors,
the statute provided even more streamlined methods for collecting against public debtors,
such as paymasters, who diverted funds.
211. 2 PTJ, supra note 38, at 624-5 (Bill No. 108). In some cases only ten days written
notice was required before the "instant" jury trial. Adjournments could be granted only for
"good cause."
It is unclear what role, if any, the revisors played in the original 1777 legislation. The revisors also proposed Bill No. 12, which defined and delimited the duties of the public treasurer
and authorized the General Court to "empanel instantly" a jury in actions against "obligors."
Id. at 374. Bill No. 12 was a "briefer" version of legislation enacted in 1776, which set forth
the duties of the public treasurer but did not include the "speedy" jury feature for trials
against "obligors." 2 PTJ 374 ("briefer"). See The Statutes at Large, supra note 153, at 9:
199.
212. Id. at 12: 352-53.
213. Id. at 9: 382. A "forestaller" was in effect a "price fixer." A "regrater" was one who
bought goods at a fair or market and then resold the same goods (at the same or a higher
price) within four miles of the place of original purchase; in short, a regrater attempted to
"comer" a market. Similarly, an "engrosser" was a wholesaler who bought imported goods
or manufactured products solely for purposes of resale.
The Assembly struggled to reconcile regulations against forestallers, etc. with the obvious
need for public contractors to supply the army and build fortifications. Loopholes abounded
and Jefferson assisted in trying to close them. The complex history of this legislation is nicely summarized at 2 PTJ, supra note 38, at 564-65.
214. 2 PTJ, at supra note 38, at 564 (quoting Mason).
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jury trials, the act featured a tripartite penalty scheme in which the jury
sentenced third and subsequent offenders to a term of imprisonment left to
its discretion. 215 Of special note for now is the juxtaposition of the jury's
extraordinary power to punish third offenders with its lack of any role in
sentencing first and second offenders. Jefferson helped draft the original
legislation, which the Assembly enacted in early 1778 and amended later
that same year. 2 16 In 1779 the Committee of Revisors also formally
reported a comprehensive bill on forestalling, etc. that stressed scrupulous
enforcement followed by truly "speedy" trials. 2 17 Grand juries were to be
"particularly" charged and placed under an oath ("specially") "that they
will present all such offences against the same coming to their knowledge,
which presentments shall be tried in a summary way, by a jury to be
impannelled and charged, unless the court, for very good cause to them
2 18
shewn, shall continue the same."
Other legislation reaffirmed the jury's longstanding role in internal

2
improvements, such as the placement of ferries, mill dams, and roads. 19

For example, twelve "able and discreet freeholders of the vicinage," men
likely to be familiar with local conditions, were to meet at the site of a
proposed road, view the land, and consider all circumstances, including
the land's use and the need for additional fencing. To ensure the jurors'
impartiality, local land owners could not provide them with "meat or
220
drink" -at least until the report was sealed and returned to court.
By far Revolutionary Virginia's most innovative use of the jury was
in setting official salaries based on the market price of tobacco. In eighteenth-century Virginia tobacco was money (quite literally). Warehouse
receipts and bills of exchange served as common currency for all forms of
transactions. 22 1 After declaring independence, Virginia indexed most offi-

215. See infra note 274 and accompanying text.
216. 2 PTJ, at supra note 38, at 564 (recounting the legislative history and Jefferson's
role).
217. Id. The committee's proposal is contained in Bill No. 89. See id. at 561-63. Bill No.
89 is based on various drafts of the forestalling/engrossing acts adopted by the Assembly. Id.
at 564.
218. Id. at 563. The Assembly considered the revisors' bill in 1785 but never enacted it.
219. Bills No. 46 (roads), No. 47 (ferries), and No. 48 (mill dams) at id., 448,454, and
464. For the acts as adopted by the General Assembly, see The Statutes at Large, supra note
153, at 12: 174-80 (roads) and 187-90 (mill dams). Boyd observes that the bill on ferries
modified and restated legislation dating to 1748. 2 PTJ, at supra note 38, at 463. The same is
true of Bill no. 50, which was a "simplified restatement" of earlier legislation, again from
1748, for appointing public storehouses and setting prices. Id. at 468-70.
220. Maintaining established roads had always been a problem. Since the colonial period,
grand juries had regularly presented road overseers who failed in their duties. Blinka, Trial
by Jury on the Eve of Revolution, supranote 44, at 542. A 1779 statute provided that surveyors who failed to perform their duties were subject to forfeitures of 10 pounds upon the "presentment of the grand jury." The Statutes at Large, supra note 153, at 10: 165. This streamlined process, probably building on colonial precedent, permitted swift and relatively easy
actions against derelict road overseers while permitting some degree of jury oversight.
221. See JOHN J. MCCUSKER, MONEY AND EXCHANGE IN EUROPE AND AMERICA, 16001775 117 (University of North Carolina Press 1978).
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cial salaries to the prevailing price of tobacco. Thus compensation for the
governor, the council, the state's highest judges, and even the tobacco
inspectors turned on the crop's market price. 222 And by 1780 Virginians
had hit upon a seemingly impartial, fair, and politically astute means of
pegging the price of tobacco: let a jury decide.
Put another way, juries established the value of tobacco in a completely non-adjudicative posture: there were no parties, no witnesses, and
no questions of law, but only a "verdict" that reflected the prevailing price
of tobacco. Colonial juries frequently heard cases, especially debt actions,
for the sole purpose of valuing old obligations in current money. 223 Now,
however, juries were asked to perform this role outside the realm of litigated private disputes. Each October the county grand jury estimated "the
current price of transfer tobacco" for purposes of setting the compensation
in money for tobacco inspectors. 224 Salaries for the governor, the privy
council, the state treasurer, the attorney general, the public auditors, and
other state officers were also set by statute in specific amounts of tobacco
(e.g., the governor received 60,000 pounds of tobacco annually). To protect against financial windfalls or disasters triggered by a fluctuating market, salaries were to be paid on a quarterly basis. And each quarter the
grand jury attending the General Court established the prevailing value of
tobacco during the preceding term. 225 Later when it appeared that the
grand jury's valuations resulted in "inadequate" salaries, the Assembly
thoughtfully supplemented them with a fixed rate of specie to be "discharged in current money of the state." Again, the grand jury determined
the exchange rate between specie and Virginia's paper money. 226 Salaries
for Virginia's most powerful judges were also fixed by weight of tobacco
as valued by juries. To guard against judicial overreaching or other mischief, the General Assembly stripped Virginia's "judiciary department"
(i.e., the state court judges) of the power to impanel juries for valuation.
Instead, the justices of the peace in Henrico County, the seat of the capital, Richmond, convened quarterly juries "to enquire into and assess upon
227
oath the value of tobacco in current money."
Elegantly republican in design, the valuation system did not work
well. Undoubtedly, the depressed tobacco market resulted in low salaries
and unhappiness by both ill-paid officials and distressed tax payers.
Empanelling grand juries became difficult. By spring 1781 British forces
222. The Statutes at Large, supra note 153, at 10: 278.
223. Blinka, Trial by Jury on the Eve of Revolution, supra note 44, at 540.

224. The Statutes at Large, supra note 153, at 10: 274. Later legislation extended the valuation process to fees owed to jurors, witnesses, and sheriffs. See id., 10: 489 (repealing this
discretion and adopting a set rate of exchange).
225. Id. at 10: 278.
226. Id. at 10: 433.
227. Id. at 10: 277. The act provided that jurors had to be freeholders "in some part of the
commonwealth" but had to be inhabitants of Henrico County. This permitted the use of city
dwellers provided they owned the minimum amount of land anywhere within the commonwealth.
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invaded Virginia. The General Assembly acknowledged the difficulty of
securing sufficient grand jurors during the "present term" and hence permitted the use of bystanders to set the price of tobacco. 228 Eventually, the
Assembly adopted fixed fees payable in specie for jurors, witnesses, and
sheriffs, perhaps because it sensed that jurors could not be trusted to set
229
their own fees.
In sum, during the Revolution Virginia used juries as a mechanism
permitting public participation in some realms of official decision-making. The Assembly built upon colonial practice as well as the state's experience with the revolutionary committees. The road and mill dam provisions trod in well-worn colonial ruts while the salary-valuation procedures
were routes freshly cut by the Revolution. The Assembly entrusted the
Henrico County jurors with the responsibility of setting the state judges'
salaries in part because the separation of powers precluded the legislature
from performing this role. Nor could the judges themselves be trusted; the
valuation jury had to "be free from the control of any of the supreme
courts." 230 The jury's valuation represented a long-standing jury function
transformed by the Revolution and designed to help legitimate the new
government. Indeed it embodied a radically extreme version of "no taxation without representation": the people's elected representatives in the
General Assembly set the gross annual compensation for public officials
and the people themselves, as jurors, calibrated the precise value in accordance with market conditions that affected all Virginians alike.
A final point: The tobacco valuation scheme underscored that juries
were not necessarily synonymous with "trials." Put differently, the jury's
231
politicization had cut it loose from its moorings in the common-law trial.
Juries in Admiralty
Virginians vividly displayed their revolutionary mettle by mandating
the use of juries in admiralty courts. This legislative innovation, strongly
endorsed and carefully sheparded by Jefferson, marked a clear break with
British practice and accorded with one of the most deeply held and loudly
voiced tenets of revolutionary rhetoric.
The "admiralty grievance" emerged at the inception of the imperial
crisis in the 1760s. 2 32 First established in the seventeenth-century, the

228. Id. at 10: 402.
229. Id. at 10: 489.
230. Id. at 10: 277.
231. For a final example, see Bill No. 100, which governed the procedures for impeachments. Although the House of Delegates initiated the process and ultimately decided the case,
Bill No. 100 provided that "every fact so put to issue shall be tried to a jury." 2 PTJ, supra
note 38, at 591. The bill was eventually enacted into law in the late 1780s. See id. at 592.
232. This account of the "admiralty grievance" relies upon John P. Reid, Constitutional
History of the American Revolution: The Authority of Rights ch. 21 (University of Wisconsin
Press 1986).
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English vice-admiralty court largely served as a trade court enforcing the
Navigation Acts. Its jurisdiction slowly expanded in an ad hoc manner
throughout the eighteenth century. 233 Provincial admiralty courts existed
in some colonies. In 1764 the Sugar Act established a vice-admiralty
court in Halifax, Nova Scotia, that had concurrent jurisdiction with the
provincial courts. More troubling, the admiralty prosecutor (or informer)
had the choice of forum and could effectively preclude a contest by
choosing Halifax. Although removal to Nova Scotia never became a problem in practice, the venue rule provoked bitter criticism. 234 The Stamp
Act (1765) exacerbated the threat and spread the protest across British
North America by imposing admiralty jurisdiction on trade violations that
had no discernable connection with seas, rivers, or any amount of
water. 235 The Townshend Duties (1767) created three additional viceadmiralty courts in Boston, Philadelphia, and Charleston. 236
Colonists fought this cascading expansion of admiralty jurisdiction
for several reasons. First, at its core, the novel expansion of admiralty
courts upset traditional practices and marked Parliament's intrusion into
matters formerly handled in colonial courts. Second, admiralty jurisdiction portended seemingly onerous, unfamiliar legal procedures. Admiralty
courts sat without juries, required heavy bonds to preserve claims to confiscated property, saddled the claimant with the costs of maintaining the
action, and imposed an extraordinarily difficult burden of proof on the
claimant seeking the return of confiscated property .237
The apparent unfairness of admiralty trials permeated revolutionary
rhetoric and became embedded in its ideology. 238 No jury meant that
colonial offenders could not bank on a sympathetic buffer between themselves and the trade laws. 239 Admiralty also featured trials conducted by a
single judge, a characteristic shared with the civil law systems of the
European continent. Although this procedure eventually became the norm
in the nineteenth century, Virginians were familiar with trials conducted
by panels of judges. Moreover, the single admiralty judge was an
233. See GIPSON, supra note 80, at 82.
234. According to Reid, only one case was removed to Halifax. REID, supra note 232, at
177-83. See also UBBELOHDE, VICE-ADMIRALTY COURTS, supra note 7, at 82.

235. See GIPSON, supra note 80, at 81 (observing that even in England revenue issues
were transferred to the vice-admiralty courts because of sympathetic local juries).
236. UBBELOHDE, VICE-ADMIRALTY COURTS, supra note 7, at 13 1.
237. See DICKERSON, supra note 81, at 212.
238. MCDONALD, Novus ORDO SECLORUM, supra note 126, at 40-41, 115. See also
UBBELOHDE VICE-ADMIRALTY COURTS, supra note 7, at ch. 6.
239. A 1536 statute extended admiralty jurisdiction to crimes committed on the seas and
permitted trial by jury as a way of offsetting other strict procedural requirements adopted
from the civil law. Convictions ordinarily required either two witnesses to the same act or a
confession, which often necessitated torture, a procedure not ordinarily employed in English
procedure. Juries, it seems, could convict on a lesser showing. See THEODORE PLUCKNETT, A
CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 662 (5th ed., Little Brown 1956). Whatever the
case, admiralty judges invariably sat without juries by the mid-eighteenth century and it does
not appear that the Revolutionary leaders used this precedent in their protests.
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appointee of the king who served at the king's pleasure. Since the judge
also shared in a percentage of fees collected from confiscated goods,
colonists held little confidence that such judges would be unbiased,
impartial, or even sympathetic to their pleas.
Thus, when in October 1776 Virginia's lawmakers adopted admiralty jurisdiction they followed Jefferson's lead by creating a court that
reflected revolutionary sentiment and built upon the admiralty commissions that had enforced the Association since late 1775.240 In light of her
maritime interests, the admiralty court was an issue of "first importance"
and Jefferson quickly took the lead in drafting its structure. 24 1 Boyd concludes that Jefferson's admiralty bill "proceeded from this rough draft to
final enactment with fewer amendments than almost any other legislation
242
from this pen[.]"
Virginia's admiralty court consisted of three judges, any two of
whom constituted a quorum, and thereby eliminated the threat represented
by a single judge. And unlike the British admiralty judge who served at
the king's pleasure and risked becoming a royal puppet to maintain
tenure, Virginia's judges held office "for so long time as they shall
demean themselves well therein." 243 Nor would claimants be arbitrarily
saddled with excessive costs; rather, the Virginia admiralty court awarded
only "reasonable costs" in appropriate cases. 244 The General Assembly
was also mindful of how British admiralty jurisdiction had expanded
beyond traditional concerns with trade. In order "[t]o prevent all doubts
which may arise," the assembly declared that the admiralty court had no
jurisdiction in capital cases.2 4 5 Serious felonies were to be tried in the
General Court. In sum, the state admiralty court closely tracked the structure that had policed the Association during the prior year.
Sharply breaking with British practice, the Virginia admiralty court
used juries to try issues of fact:
All matters of fact put in issue shall be tried by jury, unless in cases of captures
from an enemy, which shall be tried by the court; but if such capture be from an
enemy with whom the United States of America are or may be at war, then such
trial shall be by court or jury, as the American Congress shall direct.246

The admiralty act thus comported with revolutionary rhetoric and built
upon the solid foundation laid by the Convention government. It will be
240. The Statutes at Large, supra note 153, at 9: 202-06.

241. 1 PTJ, supra note 27, at 606 ("first importance").
242. Id. at 649. The revisors also reported Bill No. 92, which largely restated the 1776
act, in their 1779 report. 2 PTJ, supra note 38, at 572.
243. The Statutes at Large, supra note 153, at 9: 202.

244. Id. at 9: 205.
245. Id. at 9: 203.
246. Id. at 9: 205. Jefferson's original draft is identical. I PTJ, supra note 27, at 648.
Other states also provided for juries in admiralty action (e.g., North Carolina). UBBELOHDE,
VICE-ADMIRALTY COURTS, supranote 7, at 197, 211. The revisors' report of 1779 altered the
jury language to read "In a case where both parties are citizens of the commonwealth .. " 2
PTJ, supra note 38, at 574.
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recalled that the December 1775 Enemies to America Act had required
the admiralty commissions to employ juries in policing the Association.
Jefferson's enthusiasm had even deeper roots. In his Summary View
of 1774 he had railed against the numerous depredations against
American liberty, including Britain's evisceration of the jury trial. 247 Two
years later the Declaration of Independence indicted the king for "depriving us in many cases of trial by jury" and for shielding British officials
from justice through "mock trials." 248 Most important, Jefferson's draft of
a Virginia constitution provided that "all facts" in admiralty courts "shall
be tried by jury upon evidence viva voce." 249
The routine use of juries in admiralty cases constituted a clear, dramatic break with British justice. Not only did admiralty juries institutionalize decade-old rhetoric and revolutionary ideology, it dove-tailed nicely
with other innovative uses of juries. Yet jury trials and viva voce testimony were cumbersome, expensive, somewhat slow, and also injected uncertainty into the proceedings, concerns that would later overshadow their
benefits. Virginia was spared, however, from having to repudiate its "disastrous" experiment with admiralty juries.2 50 Virginia's admiralty court
disappeared with the adoption of the federal constitution in 1788, which
ceded admiralty jurisdiction to the federal government. Federal admiralty
courts did not adopt the use of the juries. 251
Civil Juries
In June of 1776 Thomas Jefferson drafted the Declaration of
Independence while in Philadelphia representing Virginia in the
Continental Congress. Much of his energy and attention, however,
remained focused on events in Virginia where George Mason's committee
was drafting a plan of government. For Jefferson the drafting of a written
constitution was, simply put, "the whole object" of the Revolution. 252
In his own drafts of a Virginia constitution, he carefully described the
various courts that would exercise the judicial function. 253 Turning to
247. 1 PTJ, supra note 27, at 128-29. Jefferson, it will be recalled, especially excoriated
the parliamentary act permitting the trial of alleged American criminals in English courts.
248. Id. at 431 (Declaration of Independence as adopted by Congress).
249. Id. at 343. Boyd observes that Jefferson drafted all of the judiciary bills that were
introduced in 1776-those for establishing a court of appeals, a high court of chancery, a
general court, and a court of admiralty, and a bill for "better regulating" the count courts.
Each measure "reflected the ideas set forth in [Jefferson's] constitution." Id. at 605.
250. See UBBELOHDE, VICE-ADMIRALTY COURTS, supra note 7, at 199, which characterizes the "grand experiment" with admiralty juries as "disastrous," especially in prize cases.
251. See id. at 201.

252. I PTJ, supra note 27, at 329. Jefferson explained that a plan of government was "the
whole object of the present controversy; for should a bad government be instituted for us in
the future it had been as well to have accepted at first the bad one offered to us beyond the
water without the risk and expense of contest." Id. at 330.
253. See id. at 329 (note).
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procedure, Jefferson heartily embraced the common-law jury trial, along
with its viva voce process, and made its use seemingly mandatory in all
judicial proceedings involving issues of fact:
[A]II facts ... in causes whether of Chancery, Admiralty, Ecclesiastical or
Common law shall be tried by jury upon evidence viva voce unless in those cases
law now permit the use of depos[itions] or of
where the courts of Common
254
witnesses out of the colony.

In the end the Virginia Convention relied primarily on George Mason's
draft for its 1776 constitution. Nonetheless, Jefferson's work on the revision reflects many of the ideas he first expressed about a state constitution, including an expanded role for the people through juries. 255 Escheats
and equity provide two vivid examples.
First, Virginia's revolutionaries resurrected and modified the ancient
feudal device of escheats to justify the forfeiture of loyalists' land. An
"astounding revival of feudal practice," escheats nonetheless comported
with the venerable common law and the state's republican constitution
(thereby providing the necessary "face of law"). 256 The critical concern,
of course, was determining who in fact had remained loyal to the king and
hence warranted the escheat. For this purpose, Jefferson employed inquest
juries consisting of "fit persons." 257 In sum, the escheat law tabbed the
jury with the politically sensitive task of determining one's political loyalties in war-riven Virginia.
Second, in October 1777 the Virginia Assembly established a court
of equity, designed by Jefferson, that superficially resembled its English
progenitors but which more clearly reflected the institutional innovations
borne of the Revolution. 258 The High Court of Chancery consisted of three
judges selected by both houses. 259 The judicial oath literally bespoke independence: the judges should decide cases according to "equity and good
conscience, and the laws and usages of Virginia." And, more important, all
contested issues of fact "shall be tried by a jury upon evidence given viva
voce," although the parties could waive both rights and proceed to bench
trial based on depositions. 260 To promote the convenience of jury trials in
254. Id. at 343.
255. Id. at 605.
256. PETERSON, supra note 11, at 124 ("astounding revival"). Peterson notes the irony of
Jefferson, "the most enlightened statesmen of his time," carrying out whole-sale confiscations "in the shadow of feudalism." Id. The Virginia escheat system, and its motivation, is
described by Peterson. Id. at 123-24.
257. 2 PTJ, supra note 38, at 410. The revisors' proposed escheat law was enacted by the
Assembly in 1779. See The Statutes at Large, supra note 153, at 10: 115-17. The legislative
history is recounted at 2 PTJ, supra note 38, at 412. Peterson described the process as follows: "The procedure called for the use of inquests to determine if the holders of real estate
were, in fact, British subjects; if they were the property reverted by way of escheat to the
commonwealth." PETERSON, supra note 11, at 24. Peterson concludes that the confiscation
program "failed dismally." Id.
258. 1 PTJ 619. Jefferson was the primary draftsman of this legislation.
259. The Statutes at Large, supra note 153, at 9: 389

260. Id. at 9: 394. Jefferson's original draft read simply:
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equity, the act required the sheriff to summon bystanders to sit at the ready
on each day of the chancery court's sessions. 26 1
The preference for jury trial in equity stood English law on its
head. 262 The division between equity and common law jurisdiction had
developed haphazardly over the centuries. Adding to the confusion, equity
and the common law borrowed doctrine from one another and greatly
overlapped in certain areas. 263 Although the substantive differences
between the two were elusive, an indisputably wide gulf separated the
procedures used in equity courts from those used at common law. The
hallmarks of the common law trial consisted of viva voce (oral) testimony
by witnesses subject to cross-examination before a jury. Equity's procedures were taken from the canon law. Chancellors in equity almost always
based their decisions on sworn pleadings and written depositions by witnesses without a jury's input. Parties could offer lawful evidence in equity
through the device of written interrogatories, an option unavailable at
common law. Finally, equity courts had available a far wider range of
remedies (e.g., injunctions). 264 Whether a party filed in equity or at common law, the procedures came as a "package." In short, the allocation of
issues to common law or equity was largely haphazard yet carried significant procedural ramifications; the distinction was manifestly not "the
product of a rational choice between issues which were better suited to
court or to jury trial ."265
All matters of fact material to the determination of the cause which in the course of the
proceedings shall be affirmed by the one party and denied by the other, shall be tried by
Jury, for which purpose an issue or issues shall be made up by declaration and plea as hath
heretofore been used in Chancery when issues have been specially directed to be made up
and tried by Jury.
I PTJ, supra note 27, at 615.
An amendment to the original 1776 bill added the viva voce requirement with the proviso
that depositions could be used where witnesses were unavailable. The legislative history is
recounted at id. at 620 n. 12. It is unclear whether Jefferson supported the viva voce requirement, but his 1776 bill would have limited depositions to instances where witnesses were
unavailable.
261. The sheriff was to summon bystanders "or others found within half a mile of the
courthouse." The Statutes at Large, supra note 153, at 9: 394.
262. The revisors also provided that juries should decide the validity of contested wills. 2
PTJ, supra note 38, at 396 (Bill No. 20, "A Bill Directing the Course of Descents").
263. This discussion relies on FLEMING JAMES, JR., CIVIL PROCEDURE 341-46 (Little
Brown 1965).
264. Id. at 344.
265. Id. James explained the procedural differences between the two "packages":
In equity the procedures were epistolary, included the statements of both parties, might
provide for specific relief and handle multiple parties and suits, and involved no jury. At
law the procedures involved oral testimony and cross-examination at the jury trial, relief in
rem, and the unavailability of the testimony of either party. * * * To put it colloquially, a
jury trial (or court trial) was often merely the tail of the dog under a system where you had
to take the whole dog.
id. at 345. The courts were not, however, blind to the reality that dry, technical actions such as an
accounting, for example, were ill-suited to jurors who "might be too ready to upset, on uncritical
emotional grounds, the stability which written instruments ought to represent." id. at 346.
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The Virginia reforms, then, swept away the ancient procedural distinction between law and equity. A party could file in equity and seek-the
benefits of that court's richly flexible remedies yet use the common-law
form of trial: viva voce testimony before a jury.
The Assembly also assured that the Commonwealth's highest common-law court, the General Court, would be hospitable toward juries. All
issues and damages were to be tried by jury. Even in the event of default
judgments, a jury was to decide damages unless the debt was "founded on
any specialty, bill, or note." To assure a readily available venire panel, the
sheriff was to summon sufficient bystanders each day of the session.
The Committee of Revisors, led by Jefferson, was the prime mover
behind the equity reform. First, the October 1777 act mirrored Jefferson's
proposed constitutional mandate that jury trials be used in all courts, most
notably equity and admiralty. 266 Second, Jefferson himself drafted the
1776 bill that formed the basis for the 1777 chancery act, including its
preference for juries. 267 Third, the revisors' report of June 1779 both
retained the use of juries and mandated the use of viva voce trial procedure in equity.268
The Assembly never enacted the revisors' proposed bill during its
deliberations in 1785 and 1786, but it did eliminate the right to jury in
equity proceedings in October 1787, ostensibly because of its procedural
inconvenience. 269 Yet the decade-long experiment with juries in equity,
like their use in determining public policy and in admiralty cases, was an
innovative attempt to involve the people in legal decision-making.
Equally significant, the innovation in equity, while short lived, further
solidified the identity of trial by jury-and trials generally-with viva
voce procedure.
Criminal Juries
The common law had long venerated the historic right of
Englishmen to trial by jury in criminal cases. Revolutionary ideology
266. 1 PTJ, supra note 27, at 605.
267. Id. at 619. Boyd recounts a curious disagreement between Jefferson and Pendleton
over the use of juries in equity. When the bill proposing the High Court of Chancery was
first proposed in 1776, Pendleton supported an amendment permitting trial by jury "if either
party choose." Jefferson condemned the amendment because it would have eviscerated the
use of juries by requiring a party to stand before the court and say, in effect, "Sir, I distrust
you, give me a jury." The amendment was defeated in 1777, yet decades later, in his autobiography, Jefferson mistakenly thought that it had been accepted. 2 PTJ, supra note 38, at
598-99, n. 1.
268. Id. at 594. The revisors' bill provided that matters of fact would be tried "by a jury,
in like manner as such issue ought to be tried in a court of common law, and upon like evidence as is there admissible, and not otherwise[.]" Id.
269. See id. at 598 (the Assembly eliminated the jury and viva voce procedures "because
justice is greatly delayed by the tedious forms of proceedings suitors are therefore obliged to
waste much time and expence, to the impoverishment of themselves and the state, and
decrees when obtained are with difficulty carried into execution"), quoting The Statutes at
Large, supra note 153, at 12: 464-7.
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trumpeted the jury's manifold blessings, identifying it as a fundamental
liberty almost as natural as breathing. Revolutionary Virginia built upon
this consensus and extended the criminal jury's responsibility beyond the
adjudication of guilt or innocence to the sentencing decision itself. Yet
one senses hesitation and some misgivings about the experiment's
promise. Jefferson exemplified the ambiguity early on. His first draft of a
Virginia constitution carved out a unique role for juries in criminal cases:
All fines and amercements would be "fixed by juries." 270 Jefferson's later
drafts included the same provisions and, ever so cautiously, extended the
jury's sentencing power to imprisonment in cases of contempts and misdemeanors, but not felonies. 271
Thus, within this constitutional moment Virginia's lawmakers keenly sensed that core Enlightenment values were at war with one another.
Juries were a democratic mechanism that permitted people a direct hand
in government. Yet juries were at the same time undisciplined often emotional, and occasionally irrational decision-makers. Hence, popular participation sometimes sacrificed rationality, objectivity, and consistency.
The Virginia Assembly's experience reflects an initially tentative
embrace of the jury's new found role as punisher followed by a more far
reaching adoption of the practice. As we have seen, a 1776 act punished
persons who defended British authority or incited others to "resist the
government of this commonwealth" with fines of up to twenty thousand
pounds or imprisonment for not more than five years. 272 The act also
authorized juries to fix the fine and term of imprisonment, an innovative
yet expedient measure that drew upon republican rhetoric, the experience
with committees of safety, and the Revolutionary precedent of using
juries in admiralty cases. Most important, it helped establish the courts'
legitimacy to punish dissenters. 273
The 1778 statute on forestaller, regraters, and engrossers, discussed
earlier, ultimately featured a graduated set of penalties and a more guarded role for juries, yet its drafting history reflects considerable oscillations
on these points. Jefferson was assigned to the committee that drafted the
original legislation, which was first introduced in late November 1777.274
Several drafts prescribed that first and second offenders should be subject
to amercement or imprisonment or both, as the jury's discretion. 275 Third
270. 1 PTJ, supra note 27, at 343. An "amercement" is a monetary fine.
271. Id. at 352 (second draft constitution) Jefferson's third and final draft reflected the
same rule. Id. at 362.
272. The Statutes at Large, supra note 153, at 9:170.
273. See J. M. BEATrIE, CRIME AND THE COURTS IN ENGLAND, 1660-1800 (Oxford 1986),

429. At common law juries in criminal cases could affect the sentence only indirectly by
convicting on lesser included offenses. The Virginia act authorized the jury to determine the
actual sentence. See King, supra note 8, at 938 (King begins her assessment of jury sentencing in the 1790s).
274. 2 PTJ, supra note 38, at 564 (recounting Jefferson's role the bill's legislative history
throughout the 1770s and 1780s).
275. Id. at 565 n. 11.
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offenders, according to the original draft, were to be "set on the Pillory,"
to forfeit all goods and chattels, and to be imprisoned at the jury's discretion. 276 As enacted, however, the statute clearly shielded offenders from a
jury's wrath. First offenders forfeited their goods and faced one month's
incarceration; second offenders faced twice that same punishment. Juries
played no role in the sentencing for either type of offender. Third and subsequent offenders faced the pillory, forfeitures, and imprisonment but here
too the jury's sentencing role was limited. The statute set the amount of
forfeiture at treble the value of the goods involved and capped the time
spent in the pillory at two hours, "as the court [not the jury] shall
direct[.]" 27 7 Imprisonment, however, was left to the jury's discretion,
although the term could not exceed three months, a cap that stands in
stark contrast to earlier proposals that carried no limit on the amount of
incarceration. One discerns, then, the tension between a preference for
enlightened certitude in punishment and a democratic desire to involve
the people in sentencing, especially for an offense that directly harmed the
larger public. The 1779 revisors' report adopted the penalty scheme as
enacted by the Assembly. With the end of the fighting, however, the original act lapsed after 1782.278
Other criminal offenses, mostly drafted by Jefferson, also illustrated
the tension inherent in jury-sentencing procedures that traded consistency
and certainty for popular participation and legitimacy.2 79 For example, in
the spirit of Virginia's struggle to separate church from state while
respecting diverse religious views, Bill No. 84 prohibited the arrest of
patriot-ministers while "publicly preaching or performing religious worship in any church, chapel, or meeting-house" and also sanctioned those
who "disturb[ed]" contemptuously or maliciously any assembled congregation. Although juries had (apparently) unlimited discretion to determine
the amercement and length of imprisonment under this statute, Sabbath
280
breakers faced only a ten shilling forfeiture for each offense.
Other bills related more closely to wartime hardships, turmoil, and the
need to stifle dissent. Each included some role for the jury in prescribing
punishment. Bill No. 71 punished riots, "routs," and unlawful assemblies by
permitting juries to set the amount of amercement and term of imprisonment. 281 Another proposal, Bill No. 72, punished "affrays," defined as
armed men "so hardy to come before the justices of any court" or who
276. Id. at 565-66 n. 12.
277. The Statutes at Large, supra note 153, at 9: 383.
278. Id. at 10: 425. See also 2 PTJ 565.
279. For a listing of bills chiefly prepared by Jefferson, see 2 PTJ, supra note 38, at 320.
280. Id. at 555. The Assembly later enacted this bill. The Statutes at Large, supra note
153,at 12: 336-37.
281. 2 PTJ, supra note 38, at 517. It was later adopted by the Assembly. The Statutes at
Large, supra note note 153, at 12: 331-33. See also Bill No. 37 (A Bill to Prevent Losses by
Pirates, Enemies, and Others on the High Seas), which left imprisonment to a jury's discretion where a ship's master "surrenders" or fails to defend his ship and cargo. 2 PTJ, supra

note 38, at 437.
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spread "terror" by riding armed in fairs, markets, or other public places.
Offenders forfeited their armor and faced imprisonment at the jury's discretion, but for a term not to exceed one month. 282 A third bill, No. 73, punished conspirators who abused the legal process by plotting to move falsely
and maliciously an indictment or information against another. Here too the
jury was given total discretion to determine imprisonment and amercement. 283 The fourth bill, No. 75, punished named public officers (e.g., the
treasurer, the attorney general, judges, clerks, sheriffs) who accepted any
"gift, brocage, or reward" other than that permitted by law. Those accepting
illegal gifts wcrc barrcd from office for life, forfeited the bribe's treble
value, and faced amercement and imprisonment at the jury's discretion. 284
Although Jefferson and the revisors innovated with jury sentencing
schemes, they were cautiously selective in their use. Proposed Bill No. 76
punished butchers, bakers, brewers, or distillers who sold "unwholesome"
meat, bread, or drink .285 Unlike other crimes, however, the jury played no
obvious role in sentencing. In light of wartime shortages, it was probably
not unusual to find butchers who sold the meat of animals that had died
"otherwise than by slaughter." Selling rotten food created obvious
health
risks that had to be curbed. One might also assume that such offenses
invited the venting of public outrage through jury sentencing, yet the
cryptic bill set forth the following penalty scheme:
First offense: amercement
Second offense: "judgment of the pillory."
Third offense: imprisonment and a fine.
Fourth and subsequent offense: six months hard labor in the public works.286

As proposed by Jefferson, the bill contained no references to juries or
their roles in sentencing, perhaps because the nature of the offense (e.g.,
selling bad meat) likely guaranteed a visceral, emotional reaction by a
vindictive jury, yet wartime conditions perhaps made such offenses all but
inevitable and merited the surprisingly mild penalties for first and second
offenses .287
282. Id. at 519. The Assembly enacted this bill in 1786, as drafted by Jefferson. The
Statutes at Large, supra note 153, at 12: 334.
283. 2 PTJ, supra note 38, at 520. The Assembly enacted this bill in 1786, as drafted by
Jefferson. The Statutes at Large, supra note 153, at 12:334.
284. 2 PTJ, supra note 38, at 521. The Assembly enacted this bill in 1786 with amendments which extended its penalties to attorneys who accepted bribes. Id. For the bill as
enacted, see The Statutes at Large, supra note 153, at 12: 335-36. In another proposal relating to judicial functions, the revisors proposed that justices who violated the complex rules
governing bail should by punished by "imprisonment and amercement at the discretion of a
jury." 2 PTJ, supra note 38, at 481 (No. 58, A Bill Directing What Prisoners Shall Be Let to
Bail). As later adopted by the Assembly, the act provided only for amercement at a jury's
discretion. Id. See The Statutes at Large, supra note 153, at 12: 185-86.
285. 2 PTJ, supranote 38, at 521.
286. Id. at 521-22.
287. The telling phrase "judgment of the pillory," the punishment for second offenders,
undoubtedly contemplated a vent for public outrage, verbal and physical. Boyd expresses
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In sum, the revisors cautiously approached jury sentencing in criminal cases; they did not throw open the courthouse doors and permit juries
to determine punishment in all cases. At first glance the "unwholesome"
food act, which omitted any mention of jury sentencing, appears to be an
aberration in the trend toward jury sentencing and greater public participation in legal proceedings. 2 88 Yet it reflects something more than
ambivalence about the public's role. Rather, the revisors in general, and
Jefferson in particular, greatly valued reason, objectivity, and certainty in
the law. And these values sometimes outweighed those of public participation, as best seen in Jefferson's key role in the attainder of Josiah
Philips and his proposed capital code for Virginia.
JEFFERSON AND THE JURY'S LIMITS
While enthusiastic about the people's democratic participation in
many respects, Jefferson also maintained a calculated wariness, especially
concerning juries. The innovative interposition of juries in public administration, admiralty actions, and equity proceedings was a high-water
mark. In the criminal law, where juries retained their traditional role in
determining guilt and innocence, Jefferson cautiously experimented by
selectively bestowing upon them the additional power to determine punishment.
Why the caution? No doubt, it arose in large part from a conservative reluctance to depart from the well-worn ruts of the common law.
After independence Virginia's patriots moved expeditiously to reopen the
"courts"; no thought was given to replacing them with the revolutionary
"committees" (or "councils") on a permanent basis. Jefferson had learned
law as a "form of history," 289 and history's shroud was not always easily
shrugged off. More tellingly, Jefferson's own experiences in the courts
provided countless examples of irrational, emotional, and occasionally
capricious verdicts. He knew well that skilled trial lawyers-those
"Homers of the spoken word" such as Henry-could artfully persuade
jurors to cast aside the facts, the law, and reason itself Where, however,
reason, deliberation, and enlightened certitude charted the "correct"
answer, Jefferson saw little need to risk the arbitrary currents of popular
decision-making.
In this section we will examine two instances in which Jefferson discarded jury decision-making. Jefferson's proposed code of capital punishment illustrates Jefferson's mind at work as an Enlightened philosopher
some surprise that the Assembly permitted the penalty of "hard labor in the public works" in
light of its rejection in other proposals. See id. at 522. Apparently the Assembly had no
qualms about eliminating any role for juries in sentencing. Although it amended the bill to
specify that convictions must be based on a jury's verdict, no other jury amendments were
proposed. ld.
288. See King, supra note 8, at 938.
289. PETERSON, supra note 11, at 57.

HeinOnline -- 47 Am. J. Legal Hist. 88 2005

2005

THE JURY IN JEFFERSONIAN AMERICA

and Revolutionary reformer. The attainder of Josiah Philips, which
occurred while Jefferson wrote his proposed code, embodies those same
principles in practice during the early, uncertain days of the Revolution.
"Let mercy be the character of the lawgiver,
but let the judge be a mere machine":
Enlightened Certitude and Jefferson's Capital Code
In the spring of 1778 Jefferson worked on a comprehensive revision
of Virginia's capital offenses. No other provision occupied as much of his
time or talent. Adorned with extensive, learned annotations drawn from
classical sources, obscure Anglo-Saxon authorities, and common law
precedent, the proposed capital code is also suffused with enlightened
thinking about criminal punishment. 2 90
The bill's preamble revealed the enormous influence of Cesare
Beccaria and other enlightened thinkers on Jefferson.91 An Italian legal
reformer whose own ideas were shaped by the French philosophes,
Beccaria published his masterpiece On Crimes and Punishments in 1764.
Beccaria harshly criticized the savage barbarity of eighteenth-century
criminal law, which inflicted death and gross physical torture for seemingly trivial offenses and without concern that such grisly punishment
might further degrade an already debased populace. 292
Drawing from Beccaria, Jefferson described the key principles that
animated his proposal. "[W]icked and dissolute men" sometimes succumb
to their "inordinate passions" and harm the "lives, liberties, and properties
of others." Governments must protect their citizens by inflicting "due
punishment" that is nonetheless "in proportion to his offense." A legislature must "arrange in a proper scale the crimes which it may be necessary
for them to repress, and to adjust thereto a corresponding gradation of
punishments." The overall goal (or "object worthy") should be "reformation of offenders." Capital punishment, while necessary in certain narrowly-defined cases, was an instrument of "exterminat[ion]" not reformation.
Moreover, numerous, needless death sentences weakened society in two
ways. First, unnecessary capital sentences killed "many who, if reformed,
290. 2 PTJ, supra note 38, at 504. The proposed capital code became Bill No. 64 in the
revisors' report of 1779. Jefferson painstakingly produced several beautifully handwritten
versions of the proposed code in which the "notes" appear in columns parallel to the text, in
the manner of the medieval glossators. Boyd gently chides Jefferson for indulging in
"pedantic ostentation" Id. at 505. See also PETERSON, supra note 11,at 124 ("No other draft
of legislation reveals so much of the mind and style of its author.").
In some ways, the capital code is a hodgepodge. For the most part its focus is toidentify
capital offenses in Virginia-for which offenses a person faced forfeit of his or her life. Yet
is also includes procedural rules (e.g., jury challenges, standing mute), definitions of offenses (e.g., treason, maiming), and punishments for offenses formerly treated as capital crimes
(e.g., the imposition of hard labor at public works or loss of limb).
291. Jefferson reportedly read Beccaria in Italian. PETERSON, supra note I1,at 124.
292. On Beccaria, see PETER GAY, THE ENLIGHTENMENT: THE SCIENCE OF FREEDOM 43747 (Norton 1969).
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might be restored sound members to society." Alternative punishments,
such as public labor, reformed criminals while making them "useful in
various labors for the public .

.

. and long continued spectacles to deter

others from committing the like offenses." Second, overly harsh criminal
laws defeated their own purposes by inviting neglect, perjury, and "bias"
against them. 293 In short, the certainty of some punishment was more
important than its severity. 294
Jefferson's "enlightened" criminal code purported to mitigate the
brutality of the English common law, yet its "progress" was decidedly
marginal.295 No offense was to be punishable by "deprivation of life or
limb" except those set forth in the code. In one of his many learned footnotes, Jefferson highlighted the code's beneficent elimination of the punishment of "cutting off the hand of a person striking another, or drawing
his sword in one of the Superior courts of justice." 296 Robbery and burglary no longer carried the death sentence, rather, such offenders were
"condemned to hard labor four years in the public works" and obliged to
make double reparations to the victim. 297 Murder, of course, carried a
mandatory death sentence (hanging). 298 Overall, however, the code
retained a core of brutality which suggests that Jefferson had great difficulty shaking off the dead hand of history, or at least the common law.
The following examples will suffice:
Treason: death by hanging and forfeiture of lands and goods to the Commonwealth.299
Petty treason: death by hanging followed by delivery of the body to "Anatomists
to be dissected."300
293. 2 PTJ, supra note 38, at 492-93. Boyd concurs that the preamble reveals Beecaria's
influence on Jefferson. Id. at 505.
294. See PETERSON, supra note 11, at 126.
295. Boyd contends that Jefferson's proposal was never intended to reform or to drastically change Virginia law, rather, "the law that [Jefferson] proposed did little more than restate
generally accepted practices concerning capital offenses. 2 PTJ, supra note 38, at 505. It
seems odd, however, that Jefferson would devote so much time, effort, and pride to a
"restatement" of existing practices. Thus, the proposed capital code is, I think, better viewed
as a flawed effort to effect substantial reforms in the criminal law. See PETERSON, supra note
11, at 124-29.
296. 2 PTJ, supra note 38, at 493. Without explication, Jefferson noted that the punishment had been death in an "earlier stage of the Common Law."
297. Id. at 499-500.
298. Peterson concludes that Jefferson and his fellow revisors agreed early on that capital
punishment should be eliminated except for murder and treason. PETERSON, supra note 11, at
124. Treason also carried the death sentence as did a second conviction for manslaughter. The
first conviction for manslaughter carried a mandatory seven-year sentence at hard labor in the
"public works." See PTJ, supra note 38, at 493 (treason), 495 (murder and manslaughter).
299. Id. at 493-94. The capital code defined treason as waging war against the
Commonwealth or adhering (assisting) its enemies. Jefferson also set forth rigid proof
requirements: treason must be manifested by "open deed" as testified to by at least two witnesses or the defendant's voluntary confession.
300. Id. at 494. Petty treason included a husband's murder of his wife, the parents' murder of a child, or a child's murder of his parents. Undoubtedly, the threat of dissection was
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Murder by poisoning: death by poison.3OI
Murder by dueling: death by hanging, and if the survivor was the challenger,
"his body, after death, shall be gibbeted."302
Rape, polygamy, and sodomy: for males, castration; for females, the offender
was to have a hole of a half-inch diameter bored through the cartilage of her
nose. 303

Maiming: similar disfigurement.

304

Paradoxically, Jefferson defended the code's harshness by underscoring
that one of his primary purposes had been to limit the lex talionis, which
he restricted to mayhem. 30 5 Ultimately, however, the Assembly rejected
Jefferson's proposal when it was finally considered in late 1786.306
If one looks beyond the brutality of hanging, poisoning, gibbeting,
castration, and the like, one is struck by the fixed, determinate nature of
the punishments. The jury played no sentencing role in any of the examples above, except in cases of mayhem where the jury determined what
constituted similar disfigurement in those infrequent cases where the
offender lacked the "same part" that he (or she) had deliberately disfigured. (The jury's role was to identify "some other part" of "equal
value.") 307 Put another way, strikingly absent in Jefferson's code is the
general principle of letting the jury determine the punishment-death,
imprisonment, or amercement- which loomed so large in the revisors'
other criminal proposals. Murder was punishable by hanging. Robbers
and burglars were sentenced to fixed terms of hard labor in public works
thought to be an effective deterrent given the widespread disgust with such techniques.
While serving the cause of science in some sense, mandatory dissection had triggered large,
violent riots in Britain. See Peter Linebaugh, The Tyburn Riot Against the Surgeons, in
ALBION'S FATAL TREE 65 (Douglas Hay, et al. eds., Pantheon 1975).

301. 2 PTJ, supra note 38, at 494.
302. Id. at 494-95. The gibbet involved the public display of the offender's body, which
literally rotted before the public's eye (and nose). Obviously, it was hoped that the thought
of a loved one or a friend left to rot would serve as an effective deterrent. For the families
and friends of those not so intimidated, it was a misdemeanor to remove the body (which
was to be replaced).
303. Id. at 497.
304. Id. at 498. Jefferson limited maiming to those disfigurements performed purposefully or with "malice forethought."
305. See id. at 505.
306. Id. at 506 (recounting James Madison's efforts to enact the bill). Although some
have speculated that the harshness and brutality of Jefferson's original code may have
repulsed some, ultimately it appears that it was not sufficiently brutal to satiate the
Assembly. Madison speculated that the "rage against Horse stealers" may have contributed
to the code's defeat, as apparently it was not sufficiently tough enough on such offenders. Id.
Jefferson proposed that horse stealers be punished by three years hard labor at public works
plus restitution. His notes reflected almost an acceptance of the inevitability of horse stealing-"the temptation is so great and frequent, and the facility of commission so remarkable." Id. at 500.
307. The offender was to be maimed or disfigured "in like sort." And "if that cannot be
for want of the same part, then as nearly as may be in some other part of at least equal value
and estimation in the opinion of the jury." Id. at 498.
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(4 years) and double restitution. Jefferson did, however, allow the jury to
play a limited role in sentencing one type of offender:
All attempts to delude the people, or to abuse their understanding by exercise of
the pretended arts of witchcraft, conjuration, enchantment or sorcery or by pretended prophecies, shall be punished
by ducking and whipping at the discretion
37
of a jury, not exceeding 15 stripes. 0 a

It is difficult to know why Jefferson thought juries could usefully assist in
sentencing would-be witches or sorcerers but not burglars or robbers.
Undoubtedly such cases would be rare, exotic, and controversial leaving
the jury's role as chimerical as the crime itself. Moreover, the offense
called for a delicate determination of the erstwhile witch's state of mind
and the likely effect of such pretenses on the public, a doubly subjective
finding best left to a jury.
Whatever his rationale, this single exception underscores the extent
to which Jefferson rejected any role for the jury in deciding how to punish
numerous offenders convicted of far more typical felonies. A clue revealing his attitude is found in Jefferson's proposed reforms for suicide,
which at common law was punishable by forfeiture of chattels. Jefferson's
code eliminated all forfeitures for suicide because the penalty failed
(obviously) as a deterrent and resulted only in hardships to the suicide's
family. Most important, perhaps, the public "disapprove[d] of this severity" as evidenced by "the constant practice of juries finding the suicide in a
state of insanity" in order to "save" the forfeiture. 308 Put differently, juries
nullified an unpopular law, which invited the very "neglect," "perjury,"
and "bias" that Jefferson inveighed against in the code's preamble. In
keeping with this reasoning, Jefferson wrote to Edmund Pendleton that
"'mercy may be the character of the lawgiver, but let the judge be a mere
machine."' 309
Thus, Jefferson's capital code prized core Enlightenment values of
certainty, objectivity, and reason. Harsh as it was, Jefferson's proposal
revealed a cold social calculus. In its preamble he had bemoaned the
caprice and emotion that characterized the present law, where crimes often
went unpunished because the seemingly trivial nature of the offense did
not warrant the common law's brutal sanctions. Jefferson hoped that his
proportionate scheme would result in strict enforcement of laws. The jury
would continue to play its ancient role of determining guilt, but the question of punishment was beyond its ken. Learned experts had already calibrated the necessary sanction to reform the offender or deter others; thus,
all due "mercy" had been shown. Upon conviction, the judge's task was to
apply the prescribed sanction. The people's voice had nothing further to
contribute; the people had only to listen, to watch, and to heed the lesson.

307a. Id. at 502.
308. Id. at 496 (see Jefferson's gloss on "suicide").
309. PETERSON, supra note 11, at 126.
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"But what institution is insusceptible of abuse, in wicked hands?":
The Attainder of Josiah Philips
One provision in Jefferson's proposed capital code is somewhat
310
anomalous: "No attainder shall work corruption of blood in any case."
Alien to modern criminal law, a bill of attainder represented a legislature's-not a court's-judgment of guilt. Jefferson's attainder provision
sought to eliminate one of attainder's "worst" features at common law:
the judgment condemned not only the accused, it attainted his bloodline
as well. 3 11 Yet, whatever its purported innovation, the provision's wording also implicitly recognized the legitimacy of attainder, at least under
some circumstances. And as Jefferson lavished attention on his capital
code he undoubtedly reflected on his own recent role in the Commonwealth's attainder of the notorious loyalist brigand, Josiah Philips.
Philips' gang terrorized the area of Norfolk and Princess Anne counties from 1775 to 1778. Governor Dunmore initially recruited Philips,
who pillaged the region in support of the loyalist cause in 1775. After
Dunmore departed, Philips continued to plunder and murder less for political than personal motives, yet most often selecting "patriot sympathizers
as victims."

31 2

In June 1777 Governor Patrick Henry offered a reward of

150 dollars for Philips' capture. The reward went unclaimed as the "desperadoes continued their depredations," launching forays from their safe
harbor in the Dismal Swamp. 313 Six months later it appeared that the
problem was resolved when Philips was arrested, but he soon broke jail
3 14
and continued to ransack and steal.
Philips' success in eluding capture depended as much on his strong
local support among friends and relatives who sympathized with (and perhaps profited from) his crimes as it did on geography. The swampy region
around Norfolk provided abundant shelter and made it extremely difficult
to find him, especially when local residents refused to cooperate with the
3 15
Commonwealth's efforts.

Governor Henry and his council eventually authorized 100 militia to
hunt Philips and his gang. As added incentive, the council also raised the
reward to 500 dollars for Philips' capture or death and permitted the captors to split any booty. 316 Apparently, this was not enough. In late May
1778, Governor Henry received a disturbing letter from Colonel John
310. 2 PTJ, supra note 38, at 503.
311. See id. at 506, n. 21. For Jefferson's definition of attainder, see infra note 357 and
accompanying text.
312. ADELE HAST, LOYALISM IN REVOLUTIONARY VIRGINIA: THE NORFOLK AREA AND THE
EASTERN SHORE 96 (UMI Research Press 1979). Hast spells "Philips" as "Phillips," yet contemporary documents and other historians style it as the former.
313. WILLIAM WIRT, PATRICK HENRY 610-11 (Burt Franklin 1969) (1891). See also HAST,
supra note 312, at 96-97.
314. See 2 PTJ, supra note 38, at 192.
315. HAST, supra note 312, at 97.
316. 2 PTJ, supra note 38, at 192.
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Wilson of the Norfolk militia, who wrote that Philips' gang had ambushed
and killed a militia captain less than a mile from his own home. Earlier,
the slain captain had unsuccessfully tried to capture Philips but turned
back because of the "cowardly disposition" of his troops. 3 17 A similar
"fate awaited "others," Wilson warned, unless the Commonwealth
"remov[ed] ... the relations and friends of those villains." 318 In closing,
Wilson concluded that there remained only one "means by which we can
root these wretches from us": namely, the Commonwealth must "distress
3
[Philips'] supporters." 19
The distressing letter propelled the government into action and
Thomas Jefferson, who most likely "instigated" Wilson's letter as a necessary catalyst, assumed a leading role. The governor's council instructed
Henry to send regular troops against Philips and forward Wilson's letter
to the legislature. 320 On May 28 the Assembly met as a committee of the
whole to discuss Wilson's letter. The committee issued a resolution, in
Jefferson's hand, recommending that if Philips failed to surrender by a
specific date in June he should be "attainted of high treason." Jefferson
was then named to chair a committee of three persons charged with drafting a bill of attainder. Ever efficient, Jefferson submitted a draft that same
day. 32 1 The bill was read a second time on May 29 and passed by the
lower house on May 30. Jefferson immediately carried it to the Senate,
which also approved the bill of attainder later that day. 322
The bill of attainder is a remarkably subtle work. 323 The first paragraph a long "whereas" clause, represents the Assembly's findings of
Philips' guilt and its justification for an attainder. Philips and his "confederates" "had levied war against this commonwealth .... committing murders, burning houses, wasting farms, and doing other acts of hostility[.J" 324 Unable to bring him to justice since 1775, the Assembly also
found that Philips could not be "outlaw[ed]" according to the "usual
317. Letter by Colonel John Wilson to Gov. Patrick Henry (20 May 1778), in WILLIAM
SKETCHES OF THE LIFE AND CHARACTER OF PATRICK HENRY 217-19 (James Webster 1818).

WIRT,

318. Id. at 218.
319. Id. at 218-19.
320. Boyd concurs with historians that Jefferson probably "instigated" Colonel Wilson's
letter, quoted above. 2 PTJ, supra note 38, at 192. Wilson's suggestion that families sympathetic to Philips be removed was both expensive, since the families were entitled to compensation, and bloody, as military force would probably be necessary.
321. Id. at 189-91 (Jefferson's draft).
322. Id. at 193. Boyd relies on W. P. Trent, The Case of Josiah Philips, I AMER. HIST.
REv. 444,447 (1896) (recounting the legislative history).
323. The Statutes at Large, supra note 153, at 9: 463-64.
324. The bill of attainder also contains a provision, discussed below, that permitted those
accused of being Philips' "associates" to prove their innocence by showing that they were
not in league with him after July 1, 1777, the date on which the "murders" and "devastations" began. It seems most likely that the July 1 date represented a statute of limitations of
sorts rather than a finding of fact. Philips had been active since 1775. Moreover, Jefferson's
draft left the dates blank; the Assembly later inserted the date. See 2 PTJ, supra note 38, at
190 (draft), 193.
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forms and procedures of the courts of law." The attainder provided that
Philips, as well as his "associates and confederates," had until the last day
of June 1778 to surrender before any one of a number of Commonwealth
officials so that they might stand trial "for the treasons, murders, and
other felonies by them committed." After July 1, 1778 the attainder carried harsh consequences:
[T]he said Josiah Philips, his associates and confederates, as shall not so render
him or themselves, shall stand and be convicted and attainted of high treason, and
shall suffer the pains of death, and incur all forfeitures, penalties and disabilities,
prescribed by the law against those convicted and attainted of high treason; and
that execution of this sentence of attainder shaii be done by order of the general
that any of the
court, to be entered so soon as may be conveniently after notice
325
said offenders are in custody of the keeper of the publick jail.

In the interest of domestic self-preservation, the attainder authorized the
"good people of this commonwealth" to pursue and to slay Philips and his
gang members or, alternatively, "deliver them to justice." Almost as an
afterthought borne perhaps of fears of indiscriminate killings, the act provided that those "so slain be in arms at the time, or endeavoring to escape
being taken." 326
Some months later, Philips and several accomplices were arrested
and held for trial. They were hanged in late November 1778, but the death
sentence was not based on the attainder. Rather, a grand jury had indicted
Philips for highway robbery. According to the indictment, on May 9,
1778 Philips and his "associates," while acting "with force of arms," stole
28 men's felt hats (worth 20 shillings each) and a ball of twine (valued at
5 shillings) from James Hargrove. The indictment named six witnesses to
the crime, including Hargrove. Later that very day, Philips pleaded not
guilty before the General Court, which immediately impaneled a trial jury
that heard the evidence and found him guilty of robbery as charged. In
short, Philips was indicted by a grand jury and tried by a petit jury on the
same day. One week later the court sentenced Philips to death for the
crime of robbery. On November 23, 1778, Philips and some of his accomplices were hanged to death near Williamsburg. 327 In some ways, Philips'
demise is truly anticlimactic. The almost hysterical tone of Colonel
Wilson's letter and the Assembly's rapid response with an attaint that
recounted Philips' treason, murders, and rapine is seemingly difficult to
reconcile with his death sentence for robbing felt hats.
Yet the Philips attainder is significant for several reasons. Obviously,
the attaint starkly conflicted with Revolutionary Virginia's enthrallment
with juries and the rights of the accused. It is not quite good enough to
point out, as some have, that Virginia's Declaration of Rights contained no
prohibition against attainders: those attainted clearly had a constitutional
325. The Statutes at Large, supra note 153, at 9: 464.

326. Id. at 9: 464.
327. See 2 PTJ, supra note 38, at 193. The grand jury proceedings, the indictments, and the
trial "record" are reprinted in WIRT, SKETCHES, supra note 317, at Appendix, Note C, xi-xii.
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right to jury trial. 328 Moreover, if, as Jefferson claimed, the attaint was

intended primarily to effect Philips' arrest 329 -a trial always being contem330
plated-then why not simply indict Philips and issue an arrest warrant?
The answer, however, may not relate to Philips himself, because
authorities could not have doubted the ease with which he could be convicted once caught. Rather, the challenge was to suppress the strong local
support that had protected the Philips' gang for three years. Or, as Colonel
Wilson had pointedly put the matter, the Commonwealth must "distress"
Philips' supporters. On its face, the attainder did just that. It provided a literal license to kill anyone in arms with Philips or who otherwise assisted
his "escape" after the 30-day "safe harbor" expired on July 1. Moreover,
after July 1 local authorities could imprison his "associates and confederates" who then stood attainted (i.e., convicted) of treason and faced execution. Either as a safety valve to guard against abuses or perhaps as a vent to
exercise mercy, the attainder permitted those condemned to death to prove
that they were not, in fact, Philips' associates and confederates after July 1,
1777 (a statute of limitations of sorts). A petit (trial) jury was to determine
this issue of fact, "according to the forms of the law." The accused bore the
burden of proof; if the jury "found against the defendant," execution was
to follow. The attainder thus outlawed anyone with the temerity to assist,
to protect, or to shelter Philips or his marauders.
Jefferson never repudiated, much less apologized for, the Philips
33 1
attainder, although the episode periodically flared up in later decades.
Jefferson, Patrick Henry, and Edmund Randolph once traded broadsides
about the propriety of Philips' attainder, a debate impeded by their own
selective memories of what had occurred and their roles in it.332 From the
vantage point of 1803, St. George Tucker, an influential judge and legal
authority, excoriated the attaint because it patently violated the principle
328. 2 PTJ supra note 38, at 192. Boyd noted that Virginia did not specifically proscribe
attainders, but that leading legal authorities had roundly condemned them. But see ROBERT
P. SUTrrON, REVOLUTION TO SECESSION 32 (University Press of Virginia 1989) (asserting that
leading Virginians were "sympathetic" to attainders and that Philips' raids played a role in
omitting their mention from the state's bill of rights). Merrill Peterson is also forgiving, of
Jefferson asserting that the attainder "never actually took effect" and that Virginia used the
ancient device only once, compared to nearly 60 attainders in New York and the 490 passed
in Pennsylvania. PETERSON, supra note 11, at 131-32.
329. See Jefferson's correspondence with William Wirt which is reproduced in WIRT,
SKETCHES, supra note 317, at Appendix C, ix-x.
330. Jefferson was well aware of this standard technique. Indeed, the Committee of
Revisors had incorporated it into Bill No. 103, "A Bill Directing the Method of Proceeding
against, and Trying Free Persons Charged with Certain Crimes." 2 PTJ, supra note 38, at 614.
331. See PETERSON, supra note II, at 131. See also Jefferson's comments later in life to
Wirt, reproduced at WIRT, SKETCHES, supra note 317, at Note C, ix-x.
332. 2 PTJ, supra note 38, at 191. Ten years later Randolph attacked Jefferson for the
attainder in what Boyd describes as an "amalgam of errors," which seems surprising since
Randolph was the attorney general who prosecuted Philips in 1778. Since Jefferson did not
respond to Randolph until 1815, it appears that no one else took the incident very seriously
either. Boyd also relates Henry's misty recollections and correspondence between Jefferson
and William Wirt. Wirt was writing Henry's biography at about this time.
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of separation of powers. Tucker also hailed Philips' eventual trial as a triumph of judicial independence, revealing no concerns about the rapidity
of the proceedings. 3 33 Finally, a distinguished historian concluded that the
attainder was, to say the least, [a] "surprising" entry in Jefferson's record
334
of achievements.
The attaint must be judged, however, on its own terms. 335 Philips
had murdered and pillaged in the tidewater for over three years. Drafted
by Jefferson, the attainder sailed through both the council and legislature
with Henry's approval. Philips' guilt and the appropriate punishment were
clear to all. No evidence was necessary beyond Wilson's letter and common knowledge. 336 In some ways, then, the attainder reflects Jefferson's
approach to his proposed criminal codes: Courts and juries should be
granted discretion unless reason points to a clear sensible resolution.
Philips was guilty and the times demanded immediate action. Neither the
courts nor juries had any useful role to play beyond those set forth in the
attainder. Years later, Jefferson saw the attainder as a useful instrument in
very limited circumstances:
The occasion and proper office of a bill of attainder is this; when a person
charged with a crime, withdraws from justice, or resists it by force, either in his
own or a foreign country, no other means of bringing him to trial or punishment
being practicable, a special act is passed by the legislature, adapted to the particular case; this prescribes to him a sufficient term to appear and submit to a trial by
his peers, declares that his refusal to appear shall be taken as a confession of
guilt, as in the ordinary case of an offender at the bar refusing to plead, and pronounces the sentence which would have been rendered on his confession or conviction in a court of law. No doubt that these acts of attainder have been abused
in England as instruments of vengeance by a successful over a defeated party.
337
But what institution is insusceptible of abuse, in wicked hands?

Jefferson's harshest critics berated him for traducing the separation of powers and proceeding on "vague reports," but no one suggested he was wrong

or that a jury could have arrived at a better solution. 338 Philips' guilt was
common knowledge. His refusal to face trial merely confirmed this fact. 339
333. 1 ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES 293 (1803; reprint, Paul
Finkelman and David Cobin, eds., The Lawbook Exchange 1996).
334. This is Boyd's reaction to the Philips affair. 2 PTJ, supra note 38, at 192.
335. Peterson is surprisingly defensive regarding the Philips' attainder, concluding that it
"never actually took effect" and contrasting the single instance of an attainder in Virginia
with its extensive use elsewhere. PETERSON, supra note 11, at 131.
336. It is not clear, however, just how much Jefferson or the Assembly knew about the
details of Philips' activities. Jefferson left blanks in the draft bill for Philips' given name
(Josiah), which were later filled in by Attorney General Edmund Randolph. 2 PTJ, supra
note 38, at 193 n. 1.
337. WIRT, SKETCHES, supra note 317, at C, ix-x.

338. 2 PTJ, supra note 38, at 191. In 1788 Randolph blasted Jefferson and Henry for
hastily pushing the attainder through the legislature based only on "vague reports."
Randolph never suggested they were wrong. Tucker's criticisms related entirely to judicial
independence and separation of powers.
339. In the passage quoted at infra note 337, Jefferson spoke of a refusal to appear as a
"confession of guilt," yet in his Plan for the revisal of Virginia's law Jefferson equated
"standing mute" with a plea of not guilty. 2 PTJ, supra note 38, at 325.
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Indeed, Tucker's cavil about the violation of separation of powers seems
almost trite when one considers that Philips was indicted by a grand
jury, tried by a petite jury, and convicted all on the same day-for "highway robbery."
"CROSS AND PILE" AND THE SPIRIT OF '98:
JEFFERSON'S PROPOSAL TO ELECT JURORS
One revealing motif recurs in Jefferson's later writings about juries:
in what sense is a jury's verdict superior to a coin flip? He clearly preferred the jury's homespun common sense to warped decisions by biased
judges, yet Jefferson ultimately valued science and reason over the chance
of the coin or a jury's homely wisdom. In 1798, however, Jefferson wrestled with a novel idea that harmonized democratic principles and the political cast which law and the courts had assumed since the Revolution:
jurors should be held accountable through elections.
Following his deep involvement in Virginia's Revolutionary law
revision, Jefferson had little opportunity or motive to dwell on trials or the
role of juries. A tumultuous term as a wartime governor included the
vicissitudes of a British invasion, his near capture by Tarleton's dragoons,
an impeachment, and ultimate vindication by the legislature. 340 In 1784
Congress named Jefferson to serve as a minister plenipotentiary to
France. 34 1 While in France Jefferson published Notes on the State of
Virginia, a wide-ranging set of essays intended to familiarize the old
world with the new world, especially Virginia. 342 Topics included geography, climate, population, agriculture, culture, and government.
In surveying Virginia's legal system, Jefferson recounted the revisors' work with some care and immodestly paid special attention to the
"most remarkable alternative proposals," including his plans for capital
punishment and for public education. 343 After describing the Virginia
court system, he offered several salient observations about the respective
roles of judge and jury. It was "usual" for the jury to decide all questions
of fact and defer questions of law to the magistrates (judges), yet such
deference clearly fell within the jury's "discretion." In cases involving
"public liberty" or where the judges may be biased, "the jury under take
to decide both law and fact." Acknowledging that the jury was illequipped to decide delicate or technical questions of law, Jefferson
nonetheless calculated that the damage caused by a jury's "mistake"
would be limited to discrete cases whereas biased judges could install a
bad rule into a "regular and uniform system." On balance, Jefferson preferred the hazards of "cross and pile" (a coin flip 344) to decision by "a
340.

PETERSON,

supra note 11, at 166-240.

341. Id. at 286.
342. JEFFERSON, NOTES ON
343. Id. at 144-46.
344. ld. at 130 n. 2.

VIRGINIA,

supra note 202.
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judge whose mind is warped by any motive whatever[,]" yet the common
sense of "12 honest men" trumped the arbitrariness of a coin.345
The passage has two-fold significance. First, it recognizes the
sweeping power of the jury to decide all questions of law and fact, a hallmark of the old-style trial. 34 6 Second, it constituted a half-hearted
endorsement-at best-of jury decision-making. Undoubtedly juries
would err, but their mistakes were preferable to the mischief wrought by
"warped" judges. Yet the cross and pile, while completely arbitrary, was
also superior to biased judges-a jury offered only a "better chance of a
just decision." Common sense certainly had virtues but also limitations as
well. Especially troubling was the extent to which a jury might be waylaid
by spellbinders such as Patrick Henry, who played upon its emotional
heartstrings and, like Homer's sirens, seduced the jury from the call of
reason and duty.
In 1798 Jefferson's abstractions about jury decision-making gave
way to urgent rethinking amidst the political crisis wrought by the "quasiwar" with France. The broad outlines of the story are well-known. 347
Following the adoption of the Constitution, political difference over the
Hamiltonian economic system deepened and hardened when the French
Revolution precipitated war between France and Britain. By 1798 the differences had congealed into the First American Party System. The
Federalists championed close ties with Britain, both military and commercial, and endorsed Hamilton's designs for a strong federal government
dedicated to a thriving national economy. The Democratic Republicans led
by Jefferson and James Madison, leaned more toward the French, opposed
dependence on Britain, and vigorously criticized Hamilton's economic
system. The political winds strongly favored the Federalists in the spring
of 1798. News of the XYZ Affair and France's arrogant demand for bribes
as a condition for negotiating treaties triggered a costly, bloody naval conflict between the United States and France that teetered on the brink of a
full-fledged war. 348 Feeding off the war fever, the Federalist Congress
passed legislation that authorized the expansion of the army and navy as
well as taxes to fund them. To ensure wartime unity on the home front, the
Federalists also enacted the now-infamous Alien and Sedition Acts. 349
345. Id. at 130. The complete quote reads: "In truth, it is better to toss up cross and pile in
a cause, than to refer it to a judge whose mind is warped by any motive whatever, in that
particular case. But the common sense of twelve honest men gives still a better chance of
just decisions, than the hazards of cross and pile."
346. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
347. See ELKINS AND MCKITRICK, supra note 125, at ch. 2 (the economic differences

between the Hamiltonians and the Jeffersonians), ch. 7 (the origins of political Partisanship
at the federal level), and 513-28 (the presence of identifiable parties in 1796). See also
JAMES R. SHARP, AMERICAN POLITICS IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC: THE NEW NATION IN CRISIS

(Yale University Press 1993).
348. See ALEXANDER DECONDE, THE QUASI-WAR: THE POLITICS AND DIPLOMACY OF THE

UNDECLARED WAR WITH FRANCE, 1797-1801 (Scribners 1966).

349. The acts are described at SHARP, supra note 347, at 177.

HeinOnline -- 47 Am. J. Legal Hist. 99 2005

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL HISTORY

Vol. XLVII

The Democratic-Republican Party, guided by Jefferson, opposed
both the push toward war and the misguided Federalist legislation. Their
response was hampered, however, by Jefferson's status as vice president
under a Federalist president, John Adams. Working with Madison and
other conduits, Jefferson nonetheless helped push the Kentucky
(November 1798) and Virginia (December 1798) Resolutions which
protested Federalist policy, especially the Sedition Act. Although he fervently believed that in the longer run the war fever would run its
course, 350 other measures had to be taken in the meantime to blunt the
Federalist attack. Federal prosecutors used both the common law and the
Sedition Act to suppress opponents of Federalist policies, including politicians and newspaper publishers. Grand juries returned indictments against
Democratic-Republican editors in New York and Philadelphia. 35 1 In early
November Jefferson reported to Madison that their political ally, the colorful Mathew Lyon of Vermont, had been indicted, convicted, and sentenced to four months imprisonment under the Sedition Act for uttering
words that amounted to "only general censures of the proceedings of
352
Congress and of the President."
Recognizing that political battles would continue to be fought in
courts, Jefferson suggested legislation that explicitly and overtly acknowledged the political character of courts and legal proceedings since the
1760s: namely, he proposed that jurors be elected by voters. 353 Jefferson
enclosed the draft of his "petition" from the citizens of the commonwealth" in a letter of late October to Madison. 354 The details of the proposal need not detain us. Suffice to say, Jefferson suggested that jurors be
elected from districts that coincided with his still-born plan for public
355
education. Grand jurors and federal juries were to be selected by lot.
Of greater interest are Jefferson's justifications for his radical suggestion. History taught the "mortifying truth" that those in power are
prone to "pervert" their authority for "the attainment of personal wealth
and dominion and to the utter oppression of their fellow-men." 356 The
new republic was founded upon the principle that "the people themselves
are the safest deposit of power, and that none therefore should be trusted

350. 2

THE REPUBLIC OF LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THOMAS JEFFERSON

AND JAMES MADISON, 1776-1826, 1068 (James Morton Smith, ed., Norton 1995).

351. Id. at 1068 (indictments of Benjamin Franklin Bache of Philadelphia and John D.
Burk of New York).
352. Letter by Jefferson to James Madison (3 November 1798) in id. at 1079.
353. The petition is reproduced at id. at 1076-78 and at 7 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS

JEFFERSON, 284-87 (Paul L. Ford, ed., Putnam 1896). There are slight variations in wording.
For convenience, 1have relied upon Smith.
354. Letter by Jefferson to Madison (26 October 1798) in 2 REPUBLIC OF LETTERS, supra
note 350, at 1075-76.
355. Id. at 1077-78. The proposal, while novel to Virginia, was probably based on the
practice followed in parts of New England. See supra note 14.
356. 2 REPUBLIC OF LETTERS, supra note 350, at 1076.
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to others which they can competently exercise themselves." 357 Where it
was deemed necessary to rely on public officials, such "agents" were
elected by the people themselves or appointed by those so elected. In the
judicial branch, the people shared power with judges. Specifically, the
people
sensible that they were inadequate to difficult questions of law, these were generally confided to permanent judges, but reserving to juries the decision both of law
and fact where in their opinion bias in the permanent judge might be apprehended, and where honest ignorance would be safer than perverted science: and
reserving to themselves also the whole department of facts, which constitutes
35
indeed the great mass of judiciary litigations[.] 8

The process, however, had led to a "great inconsi , c n ": a,".
th
",com
petent" to elect their legislatures and even the "highest executive" and to
decide all issues of fact in litigation, the people have little authority over
those appointed to serve on juries. Rather, jurors were selected by "officers, dependent on the executive or judiciary bodies ."359 Nor had the officers used their powers well. Even in the ordinary cases that dominated the
commonwealth's court calendars, juries were "habitually taken ...from
among accidental bystanders and too often composed of foreigners attending on matters of business, and of idle persons collected for purposes of
dissipation[.]" Yet the greater danger resided in "cases interesting to the
powers of the public functionaries," where jurors were "specially selected" such that their "ignorance or dependence renders them pliable to the
will and designs of power[.]" 360 In short, a "germ of rottedness" threatened to destroy the integrity of trial by jury. 36 1 Other states guarded
against such abuses by electing "select men" who in turn appointed jurors.
Virginia must act to "circumscribe in time the spread of that gangrene,
which sooner than many are aware, may reach the vitals of our political
existence ."362

Although the General Assembly never acted on the petition, it
nonetheless opens a revealing window into trial practice in the 1790s.
Again we see the nature of the old-style trial in which the jury had complete suzerainty over the facts and the power, when it saw fit (or just felt
like it), to decide questions of law as well. Jefferson, however, hardly
paints a compelling portrait of Virginia's juries. In ordinary cases, the jury
357. Id. at 1076.
358. Id. at 1076 n. 2. The quoted language in the first clause was suggested by Madison
and inserted by Jefferson in a later draft. Jefferson's original draft read in pertinent part:
"sensible that they were inadequate to difficult questions of law, these were in ordinary
cases, confided to pennanent judges, but reserving to juries only, extraordinary cases where
a bias in the permanent judge might be apprehended... "Id. at 1076.
359. Id. at 1077.
360. Id. at 1077.
361. See 7 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 353, at 285 (which uses "rottedness"). Smith's edition of Jefferson's correspondence reports the word as "rottenness." 2
REPUBLIC OF LETTERS, supra note 350, at 1077.
362. 2 REPUBLIC OF LETrTERS, supra note 350, at 1077.
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is swept together from among "accidental bystanders," "foreigners," and
the "dissipate[ed]." In politically charged cases (or those otherwise of
"interest"), the jury might be specially struck to ensure its "ignorance or
dependence" such that the verdict may be more easily manipulated "to the
will and designs of power." In short, Jefferson's petition caricatured juries
far differently than the "twelve honest men" he had extolled in Notes on
Virginia.
Most important, the petition also reveals Jefferson's candid reflections about trial by jury. The "great inconsistence" that justified the election of jurors is also a frank recognition that litigation was as suffused
with politics as the workings of the executive and legislative branches.
Put differently, jury verdicts, legislative acts, and executive action were
on the same plain. Curiously, however, Jefferson did not advocate the
election of judges. "[D]ifficult questions of law" demanded "permanent
judges." When revising Virginia's laws, Jefferson preferred clear rules
based on reason. Biased judges had to be checked precisely because they
"perverted science." Yet, in the end one almost senses a note of despair in
Jefferson's proposed solution to elect jurors. Decades earlier he had supported a broader use of juries in equity and admiralty and harbored no
apparent objection to their sweeping authority over the "facts," although
Jefferson assumed-or perhaps simply hoped-that juries would normally
defer questions of law to judges, except where the magistrates might be
biased. His preference for a jury's "honest ignorance" over a biased
judge's "perverted science" is a limited endorsement, at best, of common
sense and the common man. In sum, he preferred the democratic solution
but only in default of reason.
CONCLUSION
The Virginia experiment marked the apex of trials as political events
in American history. Building on the rhetoric and ideology of the resistance movement, the commonwealth's law reforms institutionalized juries
throughout the legal system. The expansion of juries into admiralty and
equity as well as their use in public administration and criminal sentencing responded to perceived British abuses yet also served a prime
Revolutionary purpose by legitimating official decision-making through
popular participation.
The common law jury was the perfect device for encompassing and
giving voice to the people's participation. Unlike "committees or conventions" that smacked of radicalism and expedience, the jury had deep roots
and an impeccable pedigree, legally, historically, and politically.
Moreover, the free-form nature of the old-style trial surely maximized and
emphasized the jury's power to decide issues as it saw fit, virtually unfettered by formal presentations of evidence or technical legal instructions.
Yet this very broad authority inevitably injected caprice, emotion, and
other irrational factors into the jury's decision-making.
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Jefferson himself embodies the divided mindset toward juries. His
writings eloquently praise the manifold virtues of trial by jury for the
"wretched criminal," yet also reflect troubled doubts about the "honest
ignorance" of those very jurors. Nor was Jefferson's dilemma limited to
abstractions. As a reformer, Jefferson designed much of the Virginia
experiment, yet, as we have seen, his proposed criminal code embodies
the triumph of reason and certainty over jurors' "honest ignorance." For
crimes tied to the cause of independence and the war effort, Jefferson supported juries because they legitimated the dispensing of punishment or
mercy. But for ordinary crimes, Jefferson saw no appropriate role for
juries in sentencing. And the attainder of Josiah Philips and his "associates," drafted in Jefferson's own hand, chillingly illustrates that juries
were not always needed to adjudicate guilt.
Nullification in the twenty-first century, then, is a shadowy vestige
of this history. A theory of nullification that explicitly recognizes the
jury's political agency rests uncomfortably with the modem conception of
the trial and the corresponding role of juries today. The modem trial, conceived as a search for "the truth" conducted under a regime of rules that
tightly regulate what the jury may consider is a very different creature
than the old-style trial of the eighteenth-century. The Virginia experiment
reveals that the founding was not, as Amar suggests, a "missed opportunity." Rather, the commonwealth eagerly embraced the opportunity, took it
to its very edge, but then pulled back. The problem then, as now, was one
of political (legal?) accountability or, put differently, the difficulty of rec36 3
onciling democracy with a rank ordered social and legal system.
Jefferson's solution of electing jurors had the virtue of explicitly, if not
dramatically, underscoring the jury's political capacity, but the suggestion
came too late. Rather, the law developed a radically different conception
of trial that closely cabined jury decision-making and denied, or, more
accurately, publicly disavowed, any political function. In short, the modem trial solved the problem by denying it exists and pretending that nullification plays no role.
When the Supreme Court again considers trial rights, civil and crimi364
it will find a record of
nal, in light of the founders' understanding,
soaring creativity, daring imagination, and inscrutable ambiguity. More
important, today's Court will confront the implications of a drastically
different conception of trial by jury.

363. JOYCE APPLEBY, THOMAS JEFFERSON 3, 39-40 (Henry Holt & Co. 2003).
364. Crawford v. Washington, supra note 5.
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